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When a taxpayer contemplates engaging in a transaction, he or she often will 
assess the tax consequences of various versions of the transaction, and his or 
her decisions about whether and how to engage in the transaction will be 
informed, in part, by the anticipated tax consequences.  Designing a transaction 
in a particular manner to achieve favorable tax consequences is known as tax 
planning.   
2012] Rethinking the Timing of Tax Decisions 1015 
Typically, tax-planning decisions must be made before a transaction has 
begun.1  In other words, most tax planning consists of “pre-transactional tax 
decisions.”  Consequently, tax decisions often occur when the taxpayer lacks 
complete information about the economic outcome of a transaction.  For 
example, when a taxpayer makes tax-planning decisions regarding a 
transaction, he or she may predict that the transaction will be profitable but 
might not know for certain if it will indeed yield any profits.  This taxpayer 
may make tax-planning decisions based on his or her prediction that the 
transaction will be profitable.  If the transaction ultimately generates a loss, the 
tax-planning decisions made in contemplation of profit may lead to less 
favorable tax consequences than those that would have resulted from tax 
planning that was based on an expectation of loss. 
“Post-transactional tax decisions” occur after a transaction has commenced.  
In some cases, a post-transactional tax decision is a response to new 
information regarding the economic outcome of a transaction.2  In the example 
in the preceding paragraph, a post-transactional tax decision would include any 
step the taxpayer took to achieve more advantageous tax results after learning 
that the transaction generated a loss.  In other cases, a post-transactional tax 
decision is a reaction to new information about the tax law itself.3  For 
example, a taxpayer might not obtain information about applicable tax law in 
advance of carrying out a transaction and, only after the transaction has  begun, 
the taxpayer may learn that more favorable tax consequences would have 
resulted had he or she employed more effective pre-transactional tax planning.  
In this situation, any attempt to alter the tax consequences of the transaction 
after it has commenced would constitute a post-transactional tax decision.  In 
other situations, a taxpayer may seek to make a post-transactional tax decision 
when the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) challenges the tax consequences that 
the taxpayer claims resulted from a completed transaction.4  In this situation, a 
post-transactional tax decision consists of any action the taxpayer takes to 
achieve more favorable tax consequences than those the IRS imposed on the 
completed transaction. 
In contrast to pre-transactional tax decisions that are often allowed,5 the tax 
law imposes substantial limitations on post-transactional tax decisions.6  This 
                                                            
 1. This is true because of limitations on “post-transactional tax decisions.”  These 
limitations are discussed infra Part I. 
 2. For further discussion, see infra Part I.B.1. 
 3. For further discussion, see infra Part I.B.2. 
 4. For further discussion, see infra Part I.B.3. 
 5. The limitations on pre-transactional tax decisions are beyond the scope of this Article.  
Such limitations include the substance-over-form doctrine, the step transaction doctrine, the 
economic substance doctrine, and a number of anti-abuse rules applicable to specific areas of tax 
law.  Literature discussing these doctrines and rules is extensive.  See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Tax 
Shelters, Tax Law, and Morality: Codifying Judicial Doctrines, 54 SMU L. REV. 9 (2001); Joseph 
Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000); Jasper L. Cummings, 
Jr., The New Normal: Economic Substance Doctrine First, 126 TAX NOTES 521 (2010); Hal Gann 
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Article suggests a number of rationales that may explain the law’s hostility 
towards post-transactional tax decisions.  If allowed, these decisions would 
grant taxpayers more opportunities to tax plan.7  Further, post-transactional tax 
decisions may reduce tax liability more effectively than pre-transactional tax 
decisions because taxpayers would be able to structure their transactions with 
the benefit of more complete information about the economic consequences of 
their transactions and about the applicable laws.  In other words,  
post-transactional tax decisions represent a particularly potent type of tax 
planning.  Consequently, general objections to tax planning may merit even 
greater restrictions on post-transactional tax decisions.   
Regarding these general objections, other scholars have criticized tax 
planning, arguing that it erodes tax revenue and creates unfairness as well as a 
perception that the tax system is unfair and breeds inefficiency.8  This Article 
builds upon existing literature by suggesting that these criticisms help explain 
the hostility to post-transactional tax decisions.  This Article concludes, 
however, that these objections do not warrant greater restrictions on all  
                                                                                                                                         
& Roy Strowd, The Recent Evolution of Antiabuse Rules, 66 TAX NOTES 1189 (1995); Mark P. 
Gergen, The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REV. 131 (2001); Daniel J. 
Glassman, Note, “It’s Not a Lie If You Believe It”: Tax Shelters and the Economic Substance 
Doctrine, 58 FLA. L. REV. 665 (2006); Daniel Halperin, Are Anti-Abuse Rules Appropriate?, 48 
TAX LAW. 807 (1995); James S. Halpern, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Determining 
Economic Substance Independent of the Language of the Code, 30 VA. TAX REV. 327 (2010); 
David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235 (1999) 
[hereinafter Hariton, Sorting Out]; David P. Hariton, When and How Should the Economic 
Substance Doctrine Be Applied?, 60 TAX L. REV. 29 (2006); Joseph Isenberg, Musings on Form 
and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859 (1982); Yoram Keinan, Rethinking the Role of 
the Judicial Step Transaction Principle and a Proposal for Codification, 22 AKRON TAX J. 45 
(2007); Jeffrey L. Kwall & Kristina Maynard, Dethroning King Enterprises, 58 TAX LAW. 1 
(2004); Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 389 (2010); Allen 
D. Madison, Rationalizing the Law by Breaking the Addiction to Economic Substance, 47 IDAHO 
L. REV. 441 (2011); Martin J. McMahon Jr., Economic Substance, Purposive Activity, and 
Corporate Tax Shelters, 94 TAX NOTES 1017 (2002); William F. Nelson, The Limits of 
Literalism: The Effect of Substance Over Form, Clear Reflection and Business Purpose 
Considerations On the Proper Interpretation of Subchapter K, 73 TAXES 641 (1995); Joshua D. 
Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REV. 365 (1988); David M. 
Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1319 (2001); 
Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a 
Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325 (2002); David J. Shakow, Consolidated Edison 
Turns on the Lights, 126 TAX NOTES 625 (2010); Robert Thornton Smith, Business Purpose: The 
Assault upon the Citadel, 53 TAX LAW. 1 (1999); Lewis R. Steinberg, Form, Substance, and 
Directionality in Subchapter C, 52 TAX LAW. 457 (1999); Steven M. Surdell, The Emerging Role 
of Business Purpose in Corporate Tax-Motivated Transactions, 485 PLI/TAX 683 (2000); Dennis 
J. Ventry, Jr., Save the Economic Substance Doctrine from Congress, 118 TAX NOTES 1405 
(2008); David A. Weisbach, Disrupting the Market for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAX. REV. 971 
(2007) [hereinafter Weisbach, Disrupting the Market]; David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax 
Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215 (2002) [hereinafter Weisbach, Ten Truths]. 
 6. See infra Part I. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
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post-transactional tax decisions.9  Specifically, although it would be advisable 
in many cases to abolish a given tax planning opportunity altogether, doing so 
is not feasible or advisable in some cases.  In such cases, restrictions on  
post-transactional tax decisions should be lessened because limiting  
post-transactional tax decisions may sometimes intensify the undesirable 
effects of allowing pre-transactional tax decisions.  This is because the  
post-transactional limitations impart even greater advantages upon taxpayers 
who plan before a transaction begins.  
Finally, tax law is by no means alone in terms of favoring those who plan 
beforehand.  In many areas of law and of life, people will be more successful 
when they plan before acting.  Although bestowing advantages upon those who 
plan is not unique to tax law, the tax benefits of planning before acting may be 
less widely understood than the benefits of planning in some other areas.10  
Because of this, tax laws should be more forgiving, at least in certain 
situations.  
This Article focuses on post-transactional tax decisions and discusses the 
ways in which tax law limits such decisions, the underlying goals that might be 
served by existing limitations, and how the law could better address these 
underlying goals.  Part I provides examples of doctrines and rules that curb 
post-transactional tax decisions, focusing in particular on the application of the 
actual transaction doctrine in certain situations.  Part II discusses in more detail  
the underlying goals that may be served by restricting post-transactional tax 
decisions.  Part III analyzes the extent to which limitations on  
post-transactional tax decisions serve the underlying goals discussed in Part II 
through the lens of the actual transaction doctrine.  Part IV suggests reform 
that could better serve these goals, suggesting that, in some circumstances, 
                                                            
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. In some areas of law, the applicable rules may be consistent with the intuitive 
assumptions of unsophisticated persons.  For example, subject to important exceptions, a failure 
to use a particular form will not generally prevent parties from forming a binding contract as long 
as their statements and actions objectively demonstrate their intent to be bound.  See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22(2) (1981) (“A manifestation of mutual assent may 
be made even though neither offer nor acceptance can be identified and even though the moment 
of formation cannot be determined.”); U.C.C. § 2-204(1)–(2) (2011) (“A contract for sale of 
goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both 
parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.  An agreement sufficient to constitute a 
contract for sale may be found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.”).  This 
lack of emphasis on formal requirements allows parties to create contracts when they may 
naturally assume they have done so.  Thus, unsophisticated parties who do not seek legal advice 
before acting may not be significantly disadvantaged because the legal consequences follow from 
the parties’ apparent intent, and the legal consequences do not depend on whether the parties 
complied with technical requirements.  On the other hand, often in tax law, a minor change to a 
transactional form can have a significant impact on the tax outcome.  See infra Part I.B.  It is not 
intuitive that structuring a transaction in a slightly different manner dramatically affects tax 
outcomes.  Thus, unsophisticated taxpayers may be unaware of the potential benefits of tax 
planning before carrying out a transaction, and, under current law, they may be significantly 
disadvantaged by their failure to engage in pre-transactional tax planning. 
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taxpayers should be given a second chance when they fail to obtain adequate 
tax advice before undertaking a transaction.  Finally, Part V concludes that 
occasionally limiting post-transactional tax decisions may exacerbate the 
negative effects of pre-transactional tax decisions because these limitations 
bestow an even greater advantage upon taxpayers who plan before a 
transaction. 
I.  CURBING POST-TRANSACTIONAL TAX DECISIONS: HOW TAX LAW 
PREVENTS SECOND CHANCES 
A variety of judicial doctrines, statutes, and regulations discourage  
post-transactional tax decisions.11  One example is the actual transaction 
doctrine.12  According to this doctrine, a taxpayer must report the tax 
consequences that follow from the actual transaction undertaken rather than the 
tax consequences that would have followed from some hypothetical, 
equivalent transaction that the taxpayer did not pursue.13  Understanding the 
doctrine and its limitations requires knowledge of tax law’s treatment of 
substance and form. 
A.  Background: Substance over Form or Form over Substance? 
In many cases, the tax consequences of a transaction are determined based 
on the underlying substance of the transaction rather than its form.14  For 
example, assume an individual, Ms. Jones, owns 100% of the outstanding 
                                                            
 11. See infra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 12. Other examples exist, including: (1) the non-disavowal doctrine; (2) limitations on the 
retroactivity of tax elections; (3) rules curbing the duplication or shifting of an existing economic 
loss; and (4) limitations on a taxpayer’s ability to unwind a transaction.  See, e.g. Douglas A. 
Kahn and Jeffrey H. Kahn, Prevention of Double Deductions of a Single Loss: Solutions in 
Search of a Problem, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2006) (discussing some of the rules that curb the 
duplication or shifting of an existing economic loss); see also infra notes 114–25 and 
accompanying text (discussing the limitations on the retroactivity of tax elections); infra notes 
73–97 and accompanying text (further discussing the non-disavowal doctrine); infra notes 98–113 
and accompanying text (discussing rescission and unwinding). 
 13. See Michael E. Baillif, The Return Consistency Rule: A Proposal for Resolving the 
Substance-Form Debate, 48 TAX LAW. 289, 310–11 (1995) (quoting Comm’r v. Nat’l Alfalfa 
Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974)) (discussing the actual transaction 
doctrine); see also Emanuel S. Burstein, The Impact of Form, and Disavowing Form, on 
Characterization of Sales Transactions, 66 TAXES 220, 224 (1988) (providing additional 
information on the actual transaction doctrine); Kenneth L. Harris, Should There Be a “Form 
Consistency” Requirement? Danielson Revisited, 78 TAXES 88, 106–08 (2000); Robert Thornton 
Smith, Substance and Form: A Taxpayer’s Right to Assert the Priority of Substance, 44 TAX 
LAW. 137, 141–43 (1990). 
 14. See Smith, supra note 13, at 137 (“A fundamental principle of . . . tax law is that 
taxation should be based upon the substance, and not the form, of transactions.”).  A complete 
discussion of substance-over-form in tax law is beyond the scope of this Article.  See, e.g., 
Hariton, Sorting Out, supra note 5, at 235–36 (discussing the economic substance doctrine); 
Isenberg, supra note 5, at 863–84; Kwall & Maynard, supra note 5, at 11–15; Rosenberg, supra 
note 5, at 385–88; Steinberg, supra note 5, at 457–500. 
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equity of Jones Corporation, an entity treated as a corporation for U.S. tax 
purposes.  Assume Ms. Jones transfers $10,000 cash to Jones Corporation in 
exchange for a newly issued instrument labeled “debt.”  The resulting tax 
consequences of this transaction will depend on whether the instrument is 
actually treated as debt or, alternatively, is treated as equity for U.S. tax 
purposes.15  If the instrument is debt for U.S. tax purposes, Jones Corporation 
will be entitled to deduct interest expense,16 but if the instrument is considered 
equity for U.S. tax purposes, Jones Corporation will not be entitled to any 
deduction for payments made on the instrument.17  The instrument will be 
treated as debt rather than equity only if the parties intend for Ms. Jones to 
have a definite right to be repaid a fixed amount at a certain time, regardless of 
the income of the corporation.18  To determine the parties’ intent, courts will 
examine underlying substantive factors rather than merely relying on the label 
given to the instrument by the taxpayer.19  Substantive factors include: whether 
Jones Corporation is thinly capitalized, the liquidity of Jones Corporation’s 
assets, the stability of Jones Corporation’s revenues, the terms of the 
instrument (such as the length of the term to maturity), the fact that the “debt” 
is held by Jones Corporation’s sole shareholder, and whether payments on the 
instrument are made when due.20   
When substance matters, the IRS will often prevail if it argues that a 
transaction should be characterized consistently with its substance.21  In the 
example above, if Jones Corporation deducts interest payments because the 
instrument was labeled “debt” and the IRS challenges this treatment citing to 
substantive factors such as thin capitalization, a very long term to maturity, and 
a history of payments not being made when due, the IRS’s challenge will 
                                                            
 15. BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 4.01 (2d ed. 1989). 
 16. Id. ¶ 4.01[2] (“Section 163(a) allows the payor corporation to deduct ‘all interest paid or 
accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness,’ but no comparable deduction is allowed for 
distributions to the corporation’s shareholders.”). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See, e.g., Bauer v. Comm’r, 748 F.2d 1365, 1367–68 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The 
determination of whether an advance is debt or equity depends on the distinction between a 
creditor who seeks a definite obligation that is payable in any event, and a shareholder who seeks 
to make an investment and to share in the profits and risks of loss in the venture.”); Tomlinson v. 
1661 Corp., 377 F.2d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 1967) (considering the intention of the parties); John 
Lizak, Inc. v. Comm’r, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 804, 807 (1969) (analyzing whether there was an intent 
to repay or if the transfer of assets was intended to be a contribution to the corporation); Schnitzer 
v. Comm’r, 13 T.C. 43, 60 (1949) (emphasizing that the intention of the parties is relevant to a 
determination of an instrument’s form). 
 19. See Bauer, 748 F.2d at 1367–68 (describing the court’s consideration of the 
“circumstances and conditions of the advance”). 
 20. Id. at 1368. 
 21. See, e.g., Baillif, supra note 13, at 289 (“[T]he Service is routinely granted the right to 
look beyond the form of a transaction or its label on a tax return . . . .”). 
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likely be successful.22  Because of this preference for substance over form, the 
U.S. tax system is, in some respects, substance-driven.    
Although the underlying substance determines the tax consequences of many 
transactions, the form of a transaction also has significance.23  A transaction 
with a given underlying substance can often be embodied in a variety of 
forms.24  Further, the tax consequences of one form may differ from the tax 
consequences of others.  The taxpayer’s chosen form will govern the resulting 
tax consequences when multiple forms lead to different tax consequences and 
when the forms are equally true to the transaction’s underlying substance.25  
Because the form selected is consistent with the transaction’s substance, the 
IRS cannot challenge the selected form based on the substance-over-form 
doctrine.26   Thus, within certain limits, the U.S. tax system is also dependent 
on form.  Consequently, as others have observed, there are two important and 
contradictory guidelines in tax law: (1) substance, rather than form, determines 
tax outcomes, and (2) form, rather than substance, determines tax outcomes.27    
The actual transaction doctrine applies when form controls.28  In cases 
involving the actual transaction doctrine, the IRS is not attempting to impose 
the tax consequences that would have followed from a form different than the 
one actually used.29  Rather, the actual transaction doctrine is implicated when 
the taxpayer attempts to claim tax results that would have followed from a 
form other than the one actually chosen.30  In such a case, the IRS can invoke 
the actual transaction doctrine to defeat the taxpayer’s claim.31     
                                                            
 22. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra Part I.B (providing examples of how varying the transactional form can affect 
tax consequences).  Tax elections provide another illustration of the significance of form in tax 
law.  See infra notes 114–25 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra Part I.B. 
 25. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 5, at 488 (noting that a taxpayer’s “transactional form 
will be respected so long as the substance . . . is consistent with the form”). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 457 (“[T]here are two fundamental principles in [corporate tax] . . . : ‘Substance 
controls, form does not’ and ‘form controls, substance does not.’”). 
 28. See infra Part I.B (discussing situations when the actual transaction doctrine applies); 
see also Baillif, supra note 13, at 311 (“[T]he actual transaction principle does not pertain to a 
controversy about form versus substance.  Instead, the principle applies when both the form and 
substance of a transaction correspond, but when a taxpayer argues for tax treatment based on a 
different transaction which she might have undertaken but did not.”). 
 29. See infra Part I.B. 
 30. See infra Part I.B. 
 31. See Baillif, supra note 13, at 310–11 (arguing that the actual transaction doctrine applies 
when the form and substance of a transaction align but a taxpayer seeks different treatment). 
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B.  When Does the Actual Transaction Doctrine Apply? 
The actual transaction doctrine prevents post-transactional tax decisions.32  
The doctrine applies in three situations: (1) the unexpected economic outcome 
situation; (2) the inadequate pre-transactional tax-planning situation; and (3) 
the overly aggressive pre-transactional tax-planning situation.33  
1.  The Unexpected Economic Outcome Situation: The Best Laid 
Tax Plans Often Go Awry  
The unexpected economic outcome situation arises when a taxpayer opts for 
a transactional form that leads to favorable tax consequences given the 
expected economic outcome of a transaction.  Unfortunately, the economic 
outcome turns out to be different than expected and the taxpayer realizes in 
retrospect that an alternative form would have led to more favorable tax 
consequences.  As a result, the taxpayer attempts to claim those consequences 
that are more favorable.  The actual transaction doctrine binds the taxpayer to 
the tax consequences that follow from the form originally chosen.34 
                                                            
 32. The actual transaction doctrine, in some circumstances, could serve other goals in 
addition to preventing post-transactional tax decisions.  One such goal is encouraging consistent 
reporting among the parties to a transaction.  If one party reports tax results in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the form actually used, he or she may also report tax consequences in a manner 
that is inconsistent with the way other parties to the transaction report tax consequences should 
they report tax consequences in a manner consistent with the form actually used.  Yet, in some 
cases, this inconsistency will not occur because all parties to the transaction will seek to report 
results consistent with the same alternative form of the transaction.  A second concern that can 
justify the actual transaction doctrine, in some circumstances, is that one party to a transaction 
could be unjustly enriched at the expense of another party to the transaction if the parties 
established the terms of the transaction on the assumption that tax results would be reported based 
on the form actually used and results are, instead, reported based on an alternative form.  
Although this may be a concern in some circumstances, as others have suggested in the context of 
the non-disavowal doctrine, such unjust enrichment could perhaps best be addressed in a private 
civil action between the parties to the transaction. See, e.g., Baillif, supra note 13, at 309–10.  
Furthermore, concerns regarding unjust enrichment are mitigated in situations in which all parties 
agree to report results consistently with an alternative transactional form because, in such 
situations, presumably no party would agree to the alternative reporting unless the party was 
adequately compensated for doing so.  As discussed below, the proposed reforms would apply 
only in a situation in which all parties agree to report based on an alternative form.  See infra Part 
IV.A.  A third rationale for the actual transaction doctrine is avoiding inconsistent reporting by a 
taxpayer over time.  In particular, without the doctrine, a taxpayer might report results based on 
the form actually used in early years and results based on the alternative form in later years.  This 
rationale, however, would not apply if a taxpayer had never reported results based on the form 
actually used.  Moreover, a separate taxpayer duty of consistency would apply in cases of 
inconsistent reporting, even absent the actual transaction doctrine.  For further discussion of the 
duty of consistency, see for example Baillif, supra note 13, at 290–94 and Steve R. Johnson, The 
Taxpayer’s Duty of Consistency, 46 TAX L. REV. 537 (1991). 
 33. See infra Part I.B.1–3 (providing examples of all three instances). 
 34. For sources providing further description of the actual transaction doctrine, see supra 
note 13. 
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To illustrate the unexpected economic outcome situation, consider the 
following example.  Two individuals, Ms. Real Property and Mr. Cash, want to 
form an entity (Real Property Corp.) to be treated as a corporation for tax 
purposes.  Ms. Real Property will own a 90% interest in Real Property Corp. 
and Mr. Cash will own the remaining 10% interest.  Real Property Corp. will 
own land and a building, assets that are currently owned by Ms. Real 
Property.35  The parties consider two possible paths to reach their goals. 
The first path (Form One) involves two steps.  First, Mr. Cash will pay cash 
to Ms. Real Property in an amount equal to 10% of the value of the land and 
the building and, in exchange, Ms. Real Property will transfer to Mr. Cash a 
10% interest in each asset.  Second, both Ms. Real Property and Mr. Cash will 
contribute their interests in the assets to Real Property Corp. in exchange for 
stock of Real Property Corp.36   
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 35. The following analysis assumes that Ms. Real Property holds the land, the building, and 
the Real Property Corp. stock as capital assets.  It further assumes that Ms. Real Property held the 
land and the building for more than one year. 
 36. See infra FIGURE 1. 
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 10% building & land 
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 Mr. Cash
Ms. Real 
Property 
 Mr. Cash 
FIGURE 1.  FORM ONE
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 The second path (Form Two) also involves two steps.  First, Ms. Real 
Property will contribute her entire interest in the land and in the building to 
Real Property Corp. in exchange for Real Property Corp. stock.  Second, Mr. 
Cash will pay cash to Ms. Real Property in an amount equal to 10% of the 
value of the land and the building and, in exchange, Ms. Real Property will 
transfer 10% of Real Property Corp. stock to Mr. Cash.37    
 
 
Form One and Form Two have the same underlying substance; both forms 
result in Real Property Corp. owning the land and the building, with Ms. Real 
Property owning 90% of Real Property Corp. stock, Mr. Cash owning 10% of 
Real Property Corp stock, and Mr. Cash transferring cash to Ms. Real 
Property.38  Moreover, neither form of the transaction is truer to the underlying 
substance than the other.39  Both forms involve the same number of steps, so it 
                                                            
 37. See infra FIGURE 2. 
 38. See supra FIGURES 1 and 2 and accompanying text. 
 39. See supra FIGURES 1 and 2 and accompanying text. 
Step One: 
building & land 
Step Two: 
Real 
Property 
Corp. 
cash 
10% X stock 
 stock 
Ms. Real 
Property 
Ms. Real 
Property 
Mr. Cash 
FIGURE 2.  FORM TWO 
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is not the case that one form is more convoluted than the other.40  Also, 
although both forms involve transitory ownership, neither form involves more 
transitory ownership than the other.  In particular, in Form One, Mr. Cash 
holds a 10% interest in the assets for a brief period of time before he transfers 
this interest to Real Property Corp., and, in Form Two, Ms. Real Property 
similarly holds 10% of the stock of Real Property Corp. for a brief period of 
time before transferring it to Mr. Cash.41  Consequently, neither form is likely 
to be successfully challenged based on the substance-over-form doctrine or 
similar rules by the IRS.42  Therefore, whichever form is selected by the 
taxpayers will control the resulting tax consequences. 
To achieve the most favorable results, the parties will evaluate the expected 
tax consequences of both forms.  Assume that the parties do not know the 
value of the land and the building.  They agree that an appraisal will establish 
the value, and they will conduct that appraisal after they undertake the 
transaction.  They assume that the assets both have built-in gains—in other 
words, they assume that the fair market value of each asset is greater than Ms. 
Real Property’s tax basis in that asset.  If the assets have built-in gains, Form 
One would lead to more favorable tax consequences than Form Two.43  
Therefore, the parties opt for Form One.   
                                                            
 40. See supra FIGURES 1 and 2 and accompanying text. 
 41. See supra FIGURES 1 and 2 and accompanying text. 
 42. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.  Under I.R.C. § 351(a), the results could be 
different in the case of Form Two if Mr. Cash were acquiring a greater than 20% interest in Real 
Property Corp., and if at the time Ms. Real Property contributed the assets to Real Property Corp.,  
Ms. Real Property had a legal obligation to transfer more than 20% of the stock of Real Property 
Corp. to Mr. Cash.  See I.R.C. § 351(a).  If such a legal obligation existed, the IRS could possibly 
challenge Ms. Real Property’s claim that the first step of the transaction qualified for  
non-recognition treatment under § 351(a) because, arguably, Ms. Real Property did not own 80% 
of the Corporation’s stock immediately after she exchanged her property for the stock.  See, e.g., 
Intermountain Lumber v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 1025, 1031 (1976) (“If the transferee, as part of the 
transaction by which the shares were acquired, has irrevocably foregone or relinquished at that 
time the legal right to determine whether to keep the shares, ownership in such shares is lacking 
for purposes of section 351.”). 
 43. For example, assume Ms. Real Property’s tax basis in the land is $50 but the fair market 
value of the land is $75, and Ms. Real Property’s tax basis in the building is $50 but the fair 
market value of the building is $60.  Based on these assumptions, the tax consequences of Form 
One would be as follows: As a result of Step One, Ms. Real Property recognizes $2.50 of tax gain 
from sale of the land (Ms. Real Property’s basis in 10% of the land is $5 and Ms. Real Property 
sells 10% of the land for $7.50), and Ms. Real Property recognizes $1 of tax gain from sale of the 
building (Ms. Real Property’s basis in 10% of the building is $5 and Ms. Real Property sells 10% 
of the building for $6).  Thus, Ms. Real Property recognizes $3.50 total of tax gain, all of which is 
long-term capital gain based on the aforementioned assumption.  See supra note 35.  After 
completion of Step One, but prior to Step Two, Ms. Real Property continues to hold a 90% 
interest in the land with a basis of $45 and a 90% interest in the building with a basis of $45.  Mr. 
Cash holds a newly acquired 10% interest in the land with a basis of $7.50 and a fair market value 
of $7.50, and Mr. Cash holds a newly acquired 10% interest in the building with a basis of $6 and 
a fair market value of $6.  Next, as Step Two, the individuals contribute these assets to Real 
Property Corp. in exchange for stock.  As a result of Step Two, neither Ms. Real Property nor Mr. 
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After the parties have undertaken the transaction using the steps in Form 
One, they receive the appraisal results and discover that even though the land 
has a built-in gain, the building has an equal, offsetting, built-in loss.  Given 
this actual economic outcome, Form Two may have led to more favorable tax 
consequences than Form One.44   
                                                                                                                                         
Cash recognize any tax gain or loss, because property is being “transferred to [Real Property 
Corp.] by [Ms. Real Property and Mr. Cash] solely in exchange for stock in [Real Property Corp.] 
and immediately after the exchange [Ms. Real Property and Mr. Cash] are in control . . . of [Real 
Property Corp.]”  I.R.C. § 351(a).  Ms. Real Property receives a 90% interest in Real Property 
Corp. stock with a basis of $90 (the basis of the land, $45, and the building, $45, that Ms. Real 
Property contributes) and a holding period of more than one year.  See id. §§ 358(a)(1), 1223(1); 
assumptions mentioned supra note 35.  Mr. Cash receives a 10% interest in Real Property Corp. 
stock with a basis of $13.50 (the basis of the land and the building that Mr. Cash contributes).  
I.R.C. § 358(a)(1).  Real Property Corp. holds land with a basis of $52.50 (the basis of the land 
Ms. Real Property contributes ($45) plus the basis of the land Mr. Cash contributes ($7.50)), and 
Real Property Corp. holds a building with a basis of $51 (the basis of the building Ms. Real 
Property contributes ($45) plus the basis of the building Mr. Cash contributes ($6)).  Id. § 362(a).  
By contrast, the tax consequences of Form Two would be as follows: As a result of Step One, Ms. 
Real Property does not recognize any tax gain or loss.  Id. § 351(a).  Ms. Real Property receives a 
100% interest in Real Property Corp. stock with a basis of $100 (the basis of the land, $50, and 
the building, $50, that Ms. Real Property contributes) and a holding period of more than one year.  
See I.R.C. §§ 358(a)(1), 1223(1); assumptions mentioned supra note 35.  Real Property Corp. 
holds land with a basis of $50 (Ms. Real Property’s basis in the land) and a building with a basis 
of $50 (Ms. Real Property’s basis in the building).  I.R.C. § 362(a).  The fair market value of Real 
Property Corp. stock is $135 (the fair market value of the land transferred by Ms. Real Property, 
$75, plus the fair market value of the building transferred by Ms. Real Property, $60).  For 
simplicity, this calculation ignores the effects on the stock’s fair market value of the corporation’s 
pending tax liability.  As a result of Step Two, Ms. Real Property recognizes $3.50 of tax gain 
from sale of 10% of the stock (Ms. Real Property’s basis in 10% of the stock is $10 and Ms. Real 
Property sells 10% of the stock for $13.50).  This tax gain is long-term capital gain because Ms. 
Real Property’s holding period in the stock is more than one year and she holds the stock as a 
capital asset.  See supra note 35.  Following the sale, Ms. Real Property continues to hold 90% of 
the Real Property Corp. stock with a basis of $90, and Mr. Cash holds a newly acquired 10% 
interest in the Real Property Corp. stock with a fair market value basis of $13.50.  The sale of 
Real Property Corp. stock has no effect on Real Property Corp.’s basis in the underlying assets 
(Real Property Corp. still has a $50 basis in each asset).  The results of Form One and Form Two 
are identical in all respects but for Real Property Corp.’s basis in the assets.  As a result of Form 
One, Real Property Corp. is left with a basis in the land of $52.50 and a basis in the building of 
$51.  As a result of Form Two, Real Property Corp. is left with a basis in the land of $50 and a 
basis in the building of $50.  Because Form One leads to tax consequences that are identical to 
those following from Form Two, except for the fact that Real Property Corp. has a higher tax 
basis in its assets, the tax consequences that follow from Form One are more favorable. 
 44. Assume, for example, Ms. Real Property’s tax basis in the land is $50 and the fair 
market value of the land is $75, and Ms. Real Property’s tax basis in the building is $50 and the 
fair market value of the building is $25.  Based on these assumptions, the tax consequences of 
Form One would be as follows: As a result of Step One, Ms. Real Property recognizes $2.50 of 
tax gain from the sale of the land (Ms. Real Property’s basis in 10% of the land is $5 and Ms. 
Real Property sells 10% of the land for $7.50), and Ms. Real Property recognizes $2.50 of tax loss 
from sale of the building (Ms. Real Property’s basis in 10% of the building is $5 and Ms. Real 
Property sells 10% of the building for $2.50).  Based on the aforementioned assumptions, the tax 
gain is long-term capital gain and the tax loss is long-term capital loss.  See supra note 35.  Thus 
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If the parties claimed the results of Form Two, arguing that they could have 
carried out the transaction in that manner, it is likely the IRS could 
successfully challenge the taxpayers and require that they report the less 
favorable results following from Form One, the form actually used.45  As one 
court articulating the actual transaction doctrine stated, “[W]hile a taxpayer is 
free to organize his affairs as he chooses, nevertheless, once having done so, he 
                                                                                                                                         
Ms. Real Property recognizes $0 of net tax gain.  After completion of Step One, but prior to Step 
Two, Ms. Real Property continues to hold a 90% interest in the land with a basis of $45 and a 
90% interest in the building with a basis of $45.   Mr. Cash holds a newly acquired 10% interest 
in the land with a basis of $7.50 and a fair market value of $7.50, and Mr. Cash holds a newly 
acquired 10% interest in the building with a basis of $2.50 and a fair market value of $2.50.  
Next, as Step Two, the individuals contribute these assets to Real Property Corp. in exchange for 
stock.  As a result of Step Two, neither Ms. Real Property nor Mr. Cash recognize any tax gain or 
loss.  I.R.C. § 351(a).  Ms. Real Property receives a 90% interest in Real Property Corp. stock 
with a basis of $90 (the basis of the land and the building that Ms. Real Property contributes) and 
a holding period of more than one year.  Id. §§ 358(a)(1), 1223(1); assumptions mentioned supra 
note 35.  Mr. Cash receives a 10% interest in Real Property Corp. stock with a basis of $10 (the 
basis of the land, $7.50, and the building, $2.50, that Mr. Cash contributes).  I.R.C. § 358(a)(1).  
Real Property Corp. holds land with a basis of $52.50 (the basis of the land Ms. Real Property 
contributes ($45) plus the basis of the land Mr. Cash contributes ($7.50)), and Real Property 
Corp. holds a building with a basis of $47.50 (the basis of the building Ms. Real Property 
contributes ($45) plus the basis of the building Mr. Cash contributes ($2.50)).  Id. § 362(a).  
These results are not affected by I.R.C. § 362(e)(2) because the assets that Real Property Corp. 
receives from Ms. Real Property do not have a net built-in loss.  Id. § 362(e)(2).  By contrast, the 
tax consequences of Form Two would be as follows: As a result of Step One, Ms. Real Property 
does not recognize any tax gain or loss.  Id. § 351(a).  Ms. Real Property receives a 100% interest 
in Real Property Corp. stock with a basis of $100 (the basis of the land and the building that Ms. 
Real Property contributes) and a holding period of more than one year.  Id. §§ 358(a)(1), 1223(1); 
assumptions mentioned supra note 35.   Real Property Corp. holds land with a basis of $50 (Ms. 
Real Property’s basis in the land) and a building with a basis of $50 (Ms. Real Property’s basis in 
the building).  I.R.C. § 362(a).  These results are not affected by § 362(e)(2) because the assets 
that Real Property Corp. receives from Ms. Real Property do not have a net built-in loss.  Id. 
§ 362(e)(2).  The value of the Real Property Corp. stock is $100 (the fair market value of the land, 
$75, and the building, $25, that Ms. Real Property contributes).  As a result of Step Two, Ms. 
Real Property recognizes $0 of tax gain from sale of 10% of the stock (Ms. Real Property’s basis 
in 10% of the stock is $10 and Ms. Real Property sells 10% of the stock for $10).  Following the 
sale, Ms. Real Property continues to hold 90% of the Real Property Corp. stock with a basis of 
$90, and Mr. Cash holds a newly acquired 10% interest in the Real Property Corp. stock with a 
fair market value basis of $10.  The sale of Real Property Corp. stock has no effect on Real 
Property Corp.’s basis in the underlying assets (so Real Property Corp. still has a $50 basis in 
each asset).  The results of Form One and Form Two are identical in all respects except for Real 
Property Corp.’s basis in the assets.  As a result of Form One, Real Property Corp. is left with a 
basis in the land of $52.50 and a basis in the building of $47.50.  As a result of Form Two, Real 
Property Corp. is left with a basis in the land of $50 and a basis in the building of $50.  
Consequently, under Form Two, Real Property Corp. has a basis in the land that is $2.50 lower 
and a basis in the building that is $2.50 higher than what resulted from Form One.  Assuming the 
building is depreciable, and the land will not be sold for many more years, having a $2.50 higher 
basis in the building and a $2.50 lower basis in the land would lead to more favorable tax 
consequences, taking into account the time value of money.  As a result, Form Two may lead to 
more favorable tax consequences than Form One. 
 45. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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must accept the tax consequences of his choice, whether contemplated or not, 
 . . . and may not enjoy the benefit of some other route he might have chosen to 
follow but did not.”46  In sum, the best-laid tax plans often go awry because a 
transaction structured with one economic outcome in mind may lead to 
suboptimal tax consequences when the economic outcome turns out to be 
different than expected.   
2.  The Inadequate Pre-Transactional Tax-Planning Situation: 
Never Put off Until Tomorrow Tax Planning You Could Do Today 
In the inadequate pre-transactional tax planning situation, a taxpayer fails to 
engage in effective tax planning before undertaking a transaction, likely 
because the taxpayer receives poor tax advice or does not seek any advice.  
Consequently, only after embarking upon the transaction does the taxpayer 
discover that using an alternative transactional form would have been 
advisable.  After making this discovery, the taxpayer argues that he or she is 
entitled to the tax consequences of that alternative form.  The actual transaction 
doctrine prohibits this argument and enforces the tax consequences of the 
taxpayer’s actual transaction.47    
The inadequate pre-transactional tax planning situation is illustrated by the 
facts of Glacier State Electrical Supply Co. v. Commissioner.48  To simplify 
the facts somewhat, in Glacier State, two individuals, “Exiting Shareholder” 
and “Remaining Shareholder,” each owned 50% of the stock of Parent, an 
entity treated as a corporation for tax purposes.49  In turn, Parent owned  
two-thirds of the stock of Subsidiary, another entity treated as a corporation for 
tax purposes.50  The remaining one-third of Subsidiary’s stock was owned by 
“Other Remaining Shareholder,” a third individual.51   
                                                            
 46. Comm’r v. Nat’l Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974) 
(citations and footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Nestlé Holdings Inc. v. Comm’r, 152 F.3d 83, 87 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (applying the actual transaction doctrine in the unexpected economic outcome 
situation). 
 47. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 48. Glacier State Elec. Supply Co. v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 1047, 1049–54 (1983). 
 49. Id. at 1049. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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FIGURE 3.  GLACIER STATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
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Upon Exiting Shareholder’s death, Subsidiary redeemed one-half of the 
stock in Subsidiary held by Parent in exchange for a check and a note.52  
Parent, in turn, transferred the check and the note to Exiting Shareholder’s 
estate to redeem the Parent stock held by Exiting Shareholder.53  Under the tax 
law in effect at the time, the transaction undertaken by the parties led to less 
favorable tax consequences than an alternative, equivalent transaction.54  In 
particular, the parties would have achieved more favorable tax consequences if 
Parent had first distributed half of its Subsidiary stock to Exiting Shareholder’s 
estate in liquidation of Exiting Shareholder’s interest in Parent and then 
subsequently Subsidiary had redeemed the Subsidiary stock held by Exiting 
Shareholder’s estate.55   
Presumably, the parties did not undertake the transaction in this alternative 
way because they failed to seek tax advice ahead of time or because they 
received faulty tax advice.  After the transaction was completed, the taxpayers 
claimed the tax consequences that would have resulted from the alternative 
transaction.56  The court rejected the taxpayers’ argument, relying on the actual 
transaction doctrine.57  The court stated, “in essence [the taxpayers are] merely 
arguing that since the transaction would have been nontaxable if cast in 
another form, we should grant similar treatment to the form [they] utilized.  
This we cannot do.”58  Thus, as a result of the actual transaction doctrine, 
                                                            
 52. Id. at 1050–51. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Both the stock in Parent that Exiting Shareholder held, and the stock in Subsidiary that 
Parent held, had built-in gains.  As a result, the form of the transaction utilized by the parties 
resulted in recognition of two levels of gain for tax purposes.  First, Parent recognized a tax gain 
upon receipt of a check and a note with a value that exceeded Parent’s basis in the Subsidiary 
stock, and, second, Exiting Shareholder recognized a tax gain upon receipt of a check and a note 
with a value that exceeded Exiting Shareholder’s basis in the Parent stock.  By contrast, if the 
parties had utilized the alternate form of the transaction, only one level of tax gain would have 
been recognized.  The transaction occurred before the repeal of the “General Utilities” doctrine.  
Therefore, under the law in effect at the time, Parent would not have recognized any gain as a 
result of distributing the Subsidiary stock to Exiting Shareholder, and Exiting Shareholder would 
have obtained a fair market value basis in the Subsidiary stock.  Exiting Shareholder would have 
recognized one level of tax gain on the Parent stock when Exiting Shareholder received 
Subsidiary stock with a fair market value that exceeded Exiting Shareholder’s basis in Parent 
stock.  However, because Exiting Shareholder obtained a fair market value basis in Subsidiary 
stock, Exiting Shareholder would not recognize any further tax gain upon receiving a check and a 
note in redemption of the Subsidiary stock.  Structured in this manner, only the tax gain built into 
the Parent stock would be recognized, as opposed to both the tax gain built into the Parent stock 
and the tax gain built into the Subsidiary stock. 
 55. See supra note 54 
 56. Glacier State, 80 T.C. at 1054. 
 57. Id. at 1057–58. 
 58. Id. at 1058. For other cases that apply the actual transaction doctrine in the inadequate 
pre-transactional tax planning situation, see Abrams v. United States, 797 F.2d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 
1986); Television Indust., Inc. v. Comm’r, 284 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1960); Lane v. United 
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taxpayers are well advised to tax plan today because, if the transaction has 
already commenced, tomorrow may be too late. 
3.  The Overly Aggressive Pre-Transactional Tax-Planning 
Situation: Look for More Certain Tax Strategies Before Leaping 
into an Aggressive Strategy 
In the overly aggressive pre-transactional tax-planning situation, a taxpayer 
could carry out a transaction using any one of at least three forms.  The first 
form (Form One) and the second form (Form Two) are both fairly safe choices; 
both are unlikely to be successfully challenged by the IRS.59  Between the first 
two forms, Form One results in tax consequences that are more favorable than 
those following from Form Two.60  A third form (Form Three) leads to the best 
possible tax consequences if the form of the transaction is unchallenged by the 
IRS based on substance-over-form principles.61  However, Form Three is also 
the least likely form to survive an IRS challenge.62  In hopes of achieving the 
best possible tax consequences, the taxpayer selects Form Three.  
Subsequently, the IRS successfully challenges the claimed tax consequences 
and asserts that the resulting tax consequences should be those that would have 
followed from Form Two under a substance-over-form analysis.63  The 
taxpayer contends that he or she is entitled to the tax consequences that would 
have followed from Form One because the taxpayer could have successfully 
used that form.  The actual transaction doctrine bars the taxpayer from 
claiming Form One’s tax consequences.64 
For an example of the overly aggressive pre-transactional tax planning 
situation, assume two individuals, Mr. Auto and Ms. Computer, plan to form a 
new limited liability company (LLC).  Currently, Mr. Auto owns ten shares of 
stock of one publicly traded company (Auto Corp.), and Ms. Computer owns 
ten shares of stock of another publicly traded company (Computer Corp.).  
Each share of Auto Corp. stock is worth $30 and has a tax basis of $40 in Mr. 
Auto’s hands.  Each share of Computer Corp. stock is worth $30 and has a tax 
basis of $20 in Ms. Computer’s hands.  After the parties form the LLC, it will 
own the shares of Auto Corp. and Computer Corp.  Both Mr. Auto and Ms. 
Computer would like to own a 50% interest in the new LLC.  The parties 
consider three possible routes to this desired result. 
The first route (Form One) involves the following steps: first, Mr. Auto buys 
five shares of Computer Corp. stock from Ms. Computer in exchange for five 
                                                                                                                                         
States, 535 F. Supp. 397, 401 (S.D. Miss. 1981); Dyess v. Comm’r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2717, 2725 
(1993); and Battaglia v. Comm’r, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 817, 822–23 (1981). 
 59. See infra FIGURES 4-6 and accompanying text. 
 60. See infra FIGURES 4–6 and accompanying text. 
 61. See infra FIGURES 4-6 and accompanying text. 
 62. See infra FIGURES 4-6 and accompanying text. 
 63. See infra FIGURES 4-6 and accompanying text. 
 64. See infra FIGURES 4-6 and accompanying text. 
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shares of Auto Corp. stock, and second, both Mr. Auto and Ms. Computer 
contribute their Auto Corp. and Computer Corp. shares to the LLC in exchange 
for 50% of the equity of the LLC.  
 
 
 
The second route (Form Two) only involves one step.  Both Mr. Auto and 
Ms. Computer contribute the shares they hold to the LLC in exchange for 50% 
of the equity of the LLC.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step One: 
Ms. 
Computer 
5 shares Auto Corp stock 
Step Two: 
5 shares Computer Corp 
  5 shares Auto Corp.,  
  5 shares Computer Corp. 
50% 
Equity 
   50% 
Equity  
Mr. Auto 
LLC 
(partnership for tax 
purposes)
Mr. Auto 
Ms. 
Computer 
5 shares Auto Corp., 
5 shares Computer Corp. 
FIGURE 4.  FORM ONE 
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The third route (Form Three) involves the following exchanges: first, Ms. 
Computer contributes ten shares of Computer Corp. stock to the LLC in 
exchange for 100% of the equity of the LLC, and second, Mr. Auto sells ten 
shares of Auto Corp. stock to the LLC in exchange for an instrument issued by 
the LLC, labeled “debt.”  The “debt” has many equity-like features.65  For 
instance, payments on the “debt” will partly depend on whether the LLC is 
profitable.66  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 65. For a discussion of features that make an instrument equity-like, see supra notes 15–20 
and accompanying text. 
 66. For discussion of the distinction between debt and equity for tax purposes, see supra 
notes 15–20 and accompanying text. 
10 shares 
Computer Corp. 
10 shares 
Auto Corp. 
50% 
equity
   50% 
equity 
LLC 
(partnership for tax 
purposes)
Mr. Auto Ms. 
Computer 
FIGURE 5. FORM TWO 
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In this situation, if the taxpayers selected either Form One or Form Two and 
reported the tax consequences that followed from the form selected, the IRS 
would not likely challenge successfully the claimed tax consequences.  It is 
possible that the IRS would challenge Form One because it involves an 
unnecessary step, and it would claim that the tax consequences that would have 
followed from Form Two are more appropriate.67  However, the taxpayers 
could likely counter this argument by relying on the purpose of relevant tax 
rules.68  Thus, Form One would likely be respected and lead to more favorable 
                                                            
 67. See supra FIGURES 4–5. 
 68. In particular, the taxpayers could point to the purpose of I.R.C. § 721(b).  Section 721(b) 
sets forth an exception to a general rule in § 721(a).  I.R.C. § 721(b) (2006).  Under the general 
rule in § 721(a), a taxpayer will not recognize tax gain or loss when he or she contributes property 
to a partnership in exchange for an equity interest in the partnership.  Id. § 721(a).  Under the 
exception, a partner will recognize gain—but not loss—upon contributing property to a 
partnership in exchange for an equity interest in the partnership if the partnership is an 
“investment company.”  Id. § 721(b).  A partnership will be an “investment company” if (1) the 
transfer results in a “diversification” of the contributing partner’s interests and (2) more than 80% 
of the value of the partnership’s assets are “held for investment and are readily marketable stocks 
or securities.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(1) (2011).  Thus, § 721(b) is designed to prevent 
taxpayers from diversifying their stock holdings without recognizing a taxable gain.  In the 
transactions shown in Figures 4 and 5, Mr. Auto and Ms. Computer diversify their stockholdings.  
Before the transaction, each owns ten shares of one corporation.  After the transaction, they each 
10 shares 
Computer Corp.  
10 shares 
Auto Corp. 
“debt” 
“100%” 
equity 
LLC 
(disregarded as separate 
from Ms. Computer for 
tax purposes, if form 
respected) 
Ms. 
Computer Mr. Auto 
FIGURE 6.  FORM THREE 
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tax consequences than Form Two.69  Form Three is the most likely to be 
challenged successfully by the IRS.70  However, if none of the forms were 
challenged and tax consequences of each transaction were reported based on 
the form of the transaction, Form Three would lead to the most favorable tax 
results.71     
                                                                                                                                         
own a 50% interest in a partnership that itself owns 10 shares of two corporations.  Thus, 
afterwards, they each indirectly have an economic interest in five shares of two corporations.  Mr. 
Auto and Ms. Computer could have achieved the same diversification if Ms. Computer had 
simply purchased five shares of Auto Corp. stock from Mr. Auto in exchange for five shares of 
Computer Corp. stock.  If they had engaged in this direct sale, Ms. Computer and Mr. Auto would 
have recognized the same amount of gain and loss that they recognize if they engage in the 
transaction using Form One.  Therefore, using Form One does not subvert the purpose of § 721(b) 
given that Form One results in the same amount of gain and loss recognition that would have 
occurred if the parties had directly diversified their stockholdings. 
 69. Under Form One, Step One, Mr. Auto recognizes $50 of tax loss upon a sale of five 
shares of Auto Corp. stock (with a basis of $40 per share or a total basis of $200) in exchange for 
five shares of Computer Corp. stock (with a fair market value of $30 per share or a total fair 
market value of $150).  As a result of Step One, Ms. Computer recognizes $50 of tax gain upon 
sale of five shares of Computer Corp. stock (with a basis of $20 per share or a total basis of $100) 
in exchange for five shares of Auto Corp. stock (with a fair market value of $30 per share or a 
total fair market value of $150).  Because of Step Two, neither Mr. Auto nor Ms. Computer 
recognize any further tax gain or loss.  I.R.C. § 721(a).  Section 721(b) does not affect this result 
because Step Two does not result in diversification as Mr. Auto and Ms. Computer contribute 
identical assets to the LLC.  Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c)(1), 1.351-1(c)(5).  In summary, as a result 
of Form One, Mr. Auto recognizes $50 of tax loss, and Ms. Computer recognizes $50 of tax gain.  
By contrast, as a result of Form Two, Mr. Auto recognizes no tax loss, and Ms. Computer 
recognizes $100 of tax gain.  I.R.C. § 721(a), 721(b).  Under Form Two, Mr. Auto recognizes no 
tax loss because § 721(a) applies, and this result is not affected by § 721(b) because § 721(b) 
applies to tax gains but not tax losses.  Id. § 721(b).  Ms. Computer recognizes all tax gains 
realized on the transaction per § 721(b).  The amount of Ms. Computer’s realized (and, thus, 
recognized) tax gain is $100 because Ms. Computer transfers Computer Corp. stock with a total 
basis of $200 ($20 per share times ten shares) to the LLC in exchange for an equity interest in the 
LLC that has a fair market value of $300 or, assuming the LLC owes no liabilities, 50% of the 
fair market value of the LLC’s assets (the fair market value of Auto Corp. stock, $300, plus the 
fair market value of Computer Corp. stock, $300). 
 70. The IRS could argue that the “debt” is really equity for tax purposes, given its  
equity-like features.  See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text (discussing whether an 
instrument is debt or equity for tax purposes).  If the “debt” in Form Three is treated as equity for 
tax purposes, Form Three will be treated as identical to Form Two for tax purposes. 
 71. If the “debt” is treated as debt for tax purposes, the results that follow from Form Three 
would be as follows: Mr. Auto recognizes all realized loss upon exchanging the Auto Corp. stock 
for the debt instrument.  Thus, Mr. Auto recognizes $100 of tax loss. Ms. Computer recognizes no 
tax gain because her contribution of Computer Corp. stock to the LLC is ignored because the 
LLC is disregarded as separate from Ms. Computer for tax purposes.  Because Ms. Computer 
owns 100% of the equity in the LLC, it will be disregarded as separate from Ms. Computer for 
tax purposes, as long as Ms. Computer does not file an election to treat LLC as a corporation.  
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(ii).  Finally, Ms. Computer will not recognize any income or gain 
when Mr. Auto transfers Auto Corp. stock to the LLC because the LLC exchanges debt for the 
Auto Corp. stock.  Consequently, the Auto Corp. stock is the proceeds of borrowing by the LLC. 
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Assume the parties opt for Form Three.  Subsequently, the IRS challenges 
the parties’ claimed tax consequences and imposes the tax consequences of 
Form Two because the “debt” received by Mr. Auto is substantively equity in 
the LLC.  In response, the parties may argue that they should be entitled to the 
tax consequences that would have followed from Form One because they could 
have carried out their transaction using Form One.  However, although it is 
true that the taxpayers could have undertaken the transaction using Form One, 
they did not do so.  Further, because of the actual transaction doctrine, a court 
is unlikely to permit the taxpayers to claim retroactively the results of Form 
One in response to an audit.72   
Consequently, if the taxpayers had engaged in less aggressive tax planning 
by using Form One, they would have achieved more favorable tax results than 
what ultimately followed the IRS’s successful challenge to Form Three.  Thus, 
taxpayers would be well advised to look for more certain tax strategies before 
leaping into an aggressive strategy. 
C.  What the Actual Transaction Doctrine is Not 
To appreciate fully the limits of the actual transaction doctrine, it is useful to 
contrast it with two related yet different concepts: (1) the non-disavowal 
doctrine and (2) the limits on a taxpayer’s ability to unwind a transaction for 
tax purposes.  As discussion of these concepts will show, the actual transaction 
doctrine is not what stands in a taxpayer’s way in every instance in which the 
taxpayer attempts to claim the tax consequences of a transaction other than the 
transaction he or she pursued. 
1.  The Non-Disavowal Doctrine 
As discussed above, the tax consequences of a transaction are determined in 
numerous cases based on the underlying substance of the transaction, rather 
than merely its form.73  In such cases, the IRS will often succeed in arguing 
that a transaction should be characterized consistently with its substance.74  By 
contrast, form will often prevail over true substance when the taxpayer urges 
treatment in accordance with substance.75  In other words, a taxpayer will face 
                                                            
 72. See, e.g., Glacier State Elec. Supply Co. v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 1047, 1058 (1983) (“This 
Court also views with disfavor attempts by taxpayers to restructure transactions after they are 
challenged.”); see also Estate of Durkin v. Comm’r, 99 T.C. 561, 575 (1992) (applying the actual 
transaction doctrine in the overly aggressive pre-transactional tax-planning situation). 
 73. See supra notes 14–22 and accompanying text. 
 74. See supra notes 14–22 and accompanying text. 
 75. For additional discussion, see BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL 
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 4.3.6 (2d ed. 1989).  See also Baillif, supra note 13, 
at 289 (“Although the Service is routinely granted the right to look beyond the form of a 
transaction or its label on a tax return, a taxpayer’s right to assert the same privilege is, at best, 
uncertain”).  See generally Michael Baillif, When (and Where) Does the Danielson Rule Limit 
Taxpayers Arguing “Substance over Form”?, 82 J. TAX’N 362 (1995); William S. Blatt, Lost on 
a One-Way Street: The Taxpayer’s Ability to Disavow Form, 70 OR. L. REV. 381 (1991); 
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significant opposition when arguing that a transaction should not be 
characterized in accordance with the form that the taxpayer adopted but rather 
by its true substance.76  This notion is embedded in what is known as the  
non-disavowal doctrine, aptly named because it limits a taxpayer’s ability to 
disavow the form that he or she chose.77   
Both the non-disavowal doctrine and the actual transaction doctrine limit 
post-transactional tax decisions.  Both doctrines accomplish this by preventing 
a taxpayer from claiming tax consequences that would have followed from a 
transactional form other than one selected.   
Although both doctrines limit post-transactional tax decisions, they apply in 
slightly different situations.  In particular, when the actual transaction doctrine 
applies, neither the taxpayer nor the IRS is able to argue for the tax 
consequences that would have followed from the non-selected form.78  By 
contrast, when the non-disavowal doctrine applies, the taxpayer would not be 
able to argue for the tax consequences that would have followed from the 
alternative form, but the IRS would be permitted to do so based on  
substance-over-form principles.79  Thus, in the examples described in Part I.B., 
the IRS could rely on the actual transaction doctrine to counter the taxpayer’s 
attempt to effectuate a post-transactional tax decision.80 
In each of these examples, the alternative form later claimed by the taxpayer 
was no more true to the transaction’s underlying substance than the form 
actually used by the taxpayer.81  Consequently, the IRS would not be able to 
impose the tax consequences that would have followed from the alternative 
form once the taxpayers selected the form actually used.82  Because of this, the 
actual transaction doctrine, rather than the non-disavowal doctrine, applies to 
                                                                                                                                         
Burstein, supra note 13; J. Bruce Donaldson, When Substance-Over-Form Argument is Available 
to the Taxpayer, 48 MARQ. L. REV. 41 (1964-1965); Harris, supra note 13; Christian A. Johnson, 
The Danielson Rule: An Anodyne for the Pain of Reasoning, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1320 (1989); 
Smith, supra note 13. 
 76. A taxpayer’s claim will not always fail.  Moreover, when the taxpayer does win, facts 
often exist that could convince the court that the taxpayer’s reason for choosing a form that was 
inconsistent with the transaction’s substance was not to create opportunities for making  
post-transactional tax decisions.  When a taxpayer seeks to convince the court of this, one factor 
that often assists the taxpayer is the existence of a non-tax explanation (or, at least, a non-U.S. 
federal income tax explanation—in other words, a state tax or foreign tax explanation may 
suffice) for why the chosen form of the transaction varied from its substance.  See Grace Soyon 
Lee, What’s In a Name?: The Role of Danielson in the Taxation of Credit Card Securitizations, 
62 BAYLOR L. REV. 110, 112 (2010) (“[W]hen the Code discusses ‘form,’ it means form as used 
for tax purposes and not form as used in other areas, such as accounting.”). 
 77. A complete discussion of the doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article.  For additional 
discussion on the non-disavowal doctrine, see supra note 75. 
 78. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
 79. See infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
 80. See supra Part I.B. 
 81. See supra Part I.B. 
 82. See supra notes 23–31 and accompanying text. 
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prevent the taxpayers from claiming the tax consequences that would have 
followed from the alternative form once the taxpayers have selected the form 
actually used. 
Maletis v. United States provides a useful example of the role of the  
non-disavowal doctrine.83  In Maletis, the taxpayer established an entity to 
operate a wine manufacturing business.84  In form, the taxpayer and his two 
sons owned the entity because paperwork had been filed with the IRS and state 
authorities indicating that the entity was owned by the three individuals and 
that all three had made contributions to the entity.85  In substance, arguably 
only the taxpayer owned the entity.86  His sons had not made their claimed 
contributions to the entity and, apparently, had no real involvement in the 
business.87   
In the years when the business was profitable, the taxpayer filed tax returns 
in accordance with the form of the arrangement (in other words, the tax returns 
were consistent with the entity being a partnership owned by three 
individuals).88  Thus, in years when the business generated taxable income, 
that income was reported in part by the taxpayer and in part by his sons.89   
This reporting led to less total tax liability than what would have occurred if all 
taxable income had been reported by the taxpayer, presumably because the 
sons were subject to lower effective tax rates than the taxpayer.90   
In a later year, when the business generated a loss, however, the taxpayer 
claimed that he substantively owned the business in its entirety and there was 
no partnership.91  Thus, the taxpayer asserted the right to deduct the entire tax 
loss, leading to lower tax liability than what would have resulted if the tax loss 
were shared between the taxpayer and his sons.92  The IRS invoked the  
non-disavowal doctrine to challenge this treatment and asserted that the 
taxpayer was bound by the form he previously selected—that of a 
partnership.93  The court held in favor of the IRS.94   
The non-disavowal doctrine—rather than the actual transaction  
doctrine—applies in Maletis because establishing the business as a partnership, 
the form used by the taxpayer, was less true to the underlying substance of the 
transaction than an alternative form, namely, establishing the business as 
                                                            
 83. Maletis v. United States, 200 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1952). 
 84. Id. at 98. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 97. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 97–98. 
 89. Id. at 98. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 97. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 97–98. 
 94. Id. 
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wholly-owned by the taxpayer.95  Consequently, even after the taxpayer 
selected the form of partnership, the IRS would be able to impose the tax 
consequences that would have followed from the alternative, more  
substance-based form of the wholly owned business.96  Therefore, the  
non-disavowal doctrine applies to prevent the taxpayer from claiming the tax 
consequences that would have followed from the wholly owned business form 
once the taxpayer selected the partnership form.97      
2.  Limits on a Taxpayer’s Ability to Unwind a Transaction for Tax 
Purposes 
Occasionally, persons may decide to reverse the non-tax effects of a 
transaction.  For example, a seller might sell property to a buyer for $1000, and 
the parties might subsequently decide to rescind the transaction.  In this case, 
the buyer will return the property to the seller, and the seller will return $1000 
to the buyer.  An individual’s motive for reversing a transaction may be  
non-tax-related.  For example, a seller and buyer may realize that a sale was 
undesirable for business reasons, and consequently decide to rescind the sale.  
In other cases, however, the decision to reverse a transaction may be  
tax-motivated.  For example, because a seller and buyer learn after a sale that 
the buyer’s ownership of the property would produce undesirable tax effects, 
the parties may agree to undo the sale in an attempt to avoid these effects. 
When parties reverse the non-tax effects of a transaction, they may claim 
that the original transaction and its reversal should be disregarded for tax 
purposes.98  For example, the seller and buyer, under the facts assumed above, 
might assert, for tax purposes, that they are entitled to ignore the sale of the 
property and its rescission.  If the transactions are ignored, the seller would not 
recognize any tax gain or loss on the sale, and none of the tax attributes of the 
property, such as its basis or holding period, would be affected by the 
transactions.99  The seller would be treated as if he or she had continued to 
hold the property for an uninterrupted period of time.100  In some cases, the 
IRS might take a contrary view of the transactions.  In particular, the IRS may 
argue that both the original sale of the property from the seller to the buyer and 
the return of the property should be treated as events that trigger tax 
consequences.101  Then, if the property had a built-in gain before the seller’s 
sale, the seller would recognize a tax gain upon sale of the property to the 
buyer.102   
                                                            
 95. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 96. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 97. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 98. David Hasen, Unwinding Unwinding, 57 EMORY L.J. 872, 877 (2008). 
 99. Id. at 873, 940–41. 
 100. Id. at 873. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 940–41. 
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A number of factors will influence a court when it decides whether to allow 
taxpayers to disregard a transaction and its reversal.103  Some courts hesitate to 
allow a taxpayer to claim such treatment when the decision to reverse the 
transaction is tax-motivated.104  This hesitancy is consistent with the aversion 
to post-transactional tax decisions. 
The actual transaction doctrine is related to limitations on a taxpayer’s 
ability to disregard a transaction and its reversal for tax purposes in that both 
features of tax law prevent post-transaction tax decisions.105  Furthermore, 
limitations on a taxpayer’s ability to disregard a transaction and its reversal can 
thwart the taxpayer’s attempts to circumvent the actual transaction doctrine.106  
However, the concepts also differ in important respects.  Each of these 
observations is discussed in more detail below. 
Limitations on a taxpayer’s ability to disregard a transaction and its reversal 
for tax reasons can frustrate taxpayers’ attempts to make post-transactional tax 
decisions.  In the unexpected economic outcome example described above, the 
taxpayers engaged in a transaction using the steps of Form One (Figure 1) and 
later discovered that they would have achieved more favorable tax 
consequences had they followed the steps of Form Two (Figure 2).107  They 
could attempt to obtain the more favorable tax consequences following from 
Form Two by reversing the steps of Form One and, subsequently, carrying out 
the steps of Form Two.  In particular, the taxpayers could reverse the steps of 
Form One as follows: first, Real Property Corp. distributes 90% of the building 
and the land to Ms. Real Property and 10% of the building and the land to Mr. 
Cash in cancellation of the Real Property Corp. stock.  Second, Mr. Cash 
returns 10% of the building and the land to Ms. Real Property in exchange for 
a return of the amount paid.  This reversal of Form One is shown in Figure 7.  
After reversing the steps of Form One, the taxpayers would undertake the steps 
of Form Two (shown in Figure 2 above). 
                                                            
 103. A complete discussion of unwinding transactions is beyond the scope of this Article.  
For further discussion of rescission or unwinding, see generally Sheldon I. Banoff, Unwinding or 
Rescinding a Transaction: Good Tax Planning or Tax Fraud?, 62 TAXES 942 (1984) and Hasen, 
supra note 98.  For further discussion of rescission in the context of post-transactional tax 
decisions, see Banoff, supra, at 942–47, 981–83, 986–87; Hasen, supra note 98, at 888–89, 935; 
and David H. Schnabel, Revisionist History: Retroactive Federal Tax Planning, 60 TAX LAW. 
685 (2007). 
 104. See, e.g., Banoff, supra note 103, at 945, 947, 982–83, 986–87. 
 105. See supra Part I.B (discussing the actual transaction doctrine). 
 106. See supra Part I.B (discussing the actual transaction doctrine). 
 107. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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However, the strategy described above is effective only if the taxpayers can 
disregard, for tax purposes, the steps of Form One (Figure 1) and the reversal 
of those steps (Figure 7).  If the taxpayers cannot disregard these steps, they 
will not succeed in avoiding undesirable tax consequences.108  As described 
                                                            
 108. If the original steps of Form One are not disregarded, they will still cause the tax 
consequences previously described.  See supra note 44.  If the steps taken to reverse Form One 
are not disregarded, Step One will be treated as a liquidation of Real Property Corp.  See supra 
FIGURE 7.  Because of the liquidation, Real Property Corp. will recognize gain with respect to the 
land in an amount equal to $22.50 ($75.00 minus $52.50).  I.R.C. § 336(a) (2006).  Real Property 
Corp. will recognize loss on the 10% of the building that is distributed to Mr. Cash (or $2.25 tax 
loss which equals 10% multiplied by (47.50 minus 25)).  Id.  However, Real Property Corp. will 
not recognize loss on the 90% of the building that is distributed to Ms. Real Property.  Id. § 
336(d)(1)(A)(ii).  Ms. Real Property recognizes no gain or loss as a result of this liquidation 
because Ms. Real Property’s tax basis in the Real Property Corp. stock equals the fair market 
value of property that Ms. Real Property receives.  Under the same rationale, the same result is 
true for Mr. Cash.  Finally, Ms. Real Property and Mr. Cash will each take a basis in the assets 
they receive that equals the assets’ fair market value.  Id. § 334(a).  In summary, if the original 
steps of Form One and the reversal of those steps are not disregarded for tax purposes, the 
transactions will result in less favorable tax consequences than the consequences that would have 
Step Two: 
Step One: 
Mr. Cash 
Real 
Property 
Corp. 
Ms. Real 
Property 
10% building & land
cash
10% building & land 90% building & land
Mr. CashMs. Real 
Property 
FIGURE 7.  REVERSING FORM ONE 
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above, courts are reluctant to disregard a transaction and its reversal when the 
reversal is tax-motivated.109  This reluctance restrains taxpayers’ ability to 
make post-transactional tax decisions. 
Moreover, this reluctance thwarts attempts by taxpayers to bypass the actual 
transaction doctrine.  If the taxpayers in the example above could reverse the 
steps of Form One and be treated, for tax purposes, as if they had never 
undertaken those steps, the taxpayers would be able to achieve the tax 
consequences of Form Two.  They could do so notwithstanding the fact that 
the actual transaction doctrine would prevent them from claiming the 
consequences of Form Two.110 
Although the actual transaction doctrine is related to aspects of tax law 
regarding rescission of transactions, there is an important distinction between 
the actual transaction doctrine and tax law applicable to the rescission of 
transactions.  On one hand, the IRS invokes the actual transaction doctrine 
when a taxpayer uses one form and argues that he or she could just as easily 
have used another form and, as a result, he or she ought to be able to claim the 
tax consequences of the non-selected form.111  On the other hand, aspects of 
tax law regarding rescissions apply when a taxpayer first uses one form but 
subsequently employs the alternative form following a reversal of the original 
transaction.112   
Further, the actual transaction doctrine only applies when the transaction 
used and the alternative transaction are equally true to the same underlying 
substance.113  If the transaction used and the alternative transaction do not have 
the same underlying substance (because, for instance, they differ in many  
non-tax respects), the taxpayer could attempt to claim the tax consequences of 
the alternative transaction only if the taxpayer unwound the initial transaction 
and carried out the alternative transaction.  Thus, in cases in which the 
transaction actually used and the alternative transaction lack the same 
underlying substance, the actual transaction doctrine is irrelevant, and limits on 
a taxpayer’s ability to unwind a transaction for tax purposes hinder  
post-transactional tax decisions. 
                                                                                                                                         
occurred had the parties originally undertaken Form Two.  Furthermore, the transactions would 
result in even less favorable tax consequences than would follow if the parties decided to accept 
the tax consequences of Form One rather than trying to reverse the transaction.  Reversing Form 
One causes recognition of additional tax gain, as well as a complete step-down in the basis of the 
building to fair market value even though not all of the built-in loss in the building is recognized. 
 109. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 111. See supra Part I.B. 
 112. Because of this difference, the actual transaction doctrine and the rules regarding 
unwinding have different effects on the goal of fostering efficiency.  See infra note 173 and 
accompanying text. 
 113. Accordingly, Form One and Form Two, as used in the unexpected economic outcome 
situation, are equally true to the underlying substance.  See supra Part I.B.1. 
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D.  A Parallel Concept: Limitations on the Retroactive Effect of Tax 
Elections 
In many situations, a taxpayer can make an election that will affect the tax 
consequences of a transaction.114  Elections available to taxpayers include: 
elections that determine how certain business entities are classified;115 
individual taxpayers’ election to either claim the standard deduction or itemize 
deductions;116 various partnership tax elections that determine how tax items 
are shared among partners117 or that determine the tax consequences following 
transfers of partnership interests or partnership distributions;118 and elections 
that affect the tax consequences of certain corporate acquisitions.119 
Moreover, regardless of whether a tax election is made, the non-tax results 
of a transaction will remain the same.120  In other words, due to a purely formal 
distinction, one transaction will lead to very different tax consequences than 
another transaction.  The only difference between the transactions is that the 
taxpayer makes a particular tax election with respect to one transaction but 
does not make the same tax election with respect to the other transaction.  
Because the only dissimilarity between the transactions is one of form, a 
decision regarding whether to make a tax election is, essentially, another 
example of an opportunity to select among different transactional forms that 
                                                            
 114. This Part I.D discusses explicit elections, or opportunities for a taxpayer to obtain 
different tax treatment without changing any of the non-tax features of his or her behavior or 
transactions.  The examples in Part I.B are examples of implicit elections, or opportunities for a 
taxpayer to obtain different tax treatment by changing some non-tax features of his or her 
behavior or transactions.  For further discussion of explicit tax elections see generally, Heather M. 
Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of Design in the Federal Income Tax 
System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21 (2010) and Edward Yorio, The Revocability of Federal Tax 
Elections, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1976).  For discussion of specific elections, see generally 
Karen C. Burke, Repairing Inside Basis Adjustments, 58 TAX LAW. 639 (2005) (discussing  
§ 754); Emily Cauble, Making Partnerships Work for Mom and Pop and Everyone Else, 2 
COLUM. J. TAX. L. 247 (2011) (discussing §§ 704(c) and 754); Laura Cunningham, Use and 
Abuse of Section 704(c), 3 FLA. TAX REV. 93  (1996) (discussing § 704(c)); Laura E. 
Cunningham & Noel B. Cunningham, Simplifying Subchapter K: The Deferred Sale Method, 51 
SMU L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing § 704(c)); Andrea Monroe, Saving Subchapter K: Substance, 
Shattered Ceilings, and the Problem of Contributed Property, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (2009) 
(discussing § 704(c)); Joel Scharfstein, An Analysis of the Section 704(c) Regulations, 48 TAX 
LAW. 71 (1994) (discussing § 704(c)); George K. Yin, The Taxation of Private Business 
Enterprises: Some Policy Questions Stimulated by the “Check-the-Box” Regulations, 51 SMU L. 
REV. 125 (1997) (discussing entity classification elections). 
 115. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2. 
 116. I.R.C. § 63(b), (c), (e) (2006). 
 117. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3. 
 118. I.R.C. § 754. 
 119. I.R.C. § 338. 
 120. See, e.g., Field, supra note 114, at 30 (“Explicit elections, by definition, affect taxes 
only; they lack non-tax legal impact.”); Yin, supra note 114, at 130 (mentioning that tax elections 
have “ramifications for tax purposes only”). 
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lead to different tax consequences despite having the same underlying 
substance.   
Moreover, taxpayers will often engage in tax planning at the  
pre-transactional stage to evaluate which election will lead to the most 
favorable tax consequences, at least with respect to a tax election that cannot 
be made retroactively.  In addition, for precisely the same reasons that a 
taxpayer seeks to effectuate a post-transactional tax decision after selecting a 
particular transactional form, a taxpayer may also seek to change a tax election 
after a transaction has occurred.  
In particular, there are three situations in which a taxpayer may want to 
retroactively modify a tax election.  These situations are: (1) the unexpected 
economic outcome situation;121 (2) the inadequate pre-transactional  
tax-planning situation;122 and (3) the overly aggressive pre-transactional  
tax-planning situation.123  These three situations correspond to the identically 
                                                            
 121. In the unexpected economic outcome situation, existing rules prevent a taxpayer from 
retroactively modifying a tax election, at least in the case of some elections.  For example, in the 
case of an entity classification election, the effective date of an election can be no earlier than 
seventy-five days before the election is filed.  Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(iii) (2011).  In some 
circumstances, the taxpayer will be granted relief to file an election later than seventy-five days 
after the desired effective date.  Specifically, if the entity requests relief for a late classification 
election within three years and seventy-five days of the desired effective date, relief will 
automatically be granted if: (1) the entity failed to obtain its desired classification solely because 
the relevant form was not filed in a timely manner; (2) the entity has either not yet filed a tax 
return or has filed tax returns consistent with its desired classification; and (3) the entity has 
“reasonable cause” for its failure to timely file the election.  See Rev. Proc. 2009-41, 2009-39 
I.R.B. 440.  These three requirements likely prevent a taxpayer from obtaining relief in an 
unexpected economic outcome situation.  If the taxpayer is not entitled to automatic relief for 
filing a late election, the taxpayer must request a private letter ruling.  Id.  In such a case, the 
Treasury Regulations specifically provide that a taxpayer will not be entitled to file a late election 
if the taxpayer “uses hindsight.”  Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3(b)(3)(iii).  Elaborating on this 
statement, the regulations provide, “If specific facts have changed since the due date for making 
the election that make the election advantageous to a taxpayer, the IRS will not ordinarily grant 
relief. In such a case, the IRS will grant relief only when the taxpayer provides strong proof that 
the taxpayer’s decision to seek relief did not involve hindsight.”  Id.  Therefore, the regulations 
specifically prohibit late filing of an entity classification election as a means of carrying out a 
post-transactional tax decision in an unexpected economic outcome situation.  See Schnabel, 
supra note 103, at 718–22 (providing additional discussion of post-transactional tax decisions in 
the context of entity classification). 
 122. In the inadequate pre-transactional tax-planning situation, in the case of some elections, 
a taxpayer cannot make his or her desired election retroactively.  Furthermore, in some cases, 
relief is readily available when inadequate pre-transactional tax planning results in a failure to 
properly make an intended election.  However, relief may be less obtainable when inadequate 
pre-transactional tax planning results in a failure to intend to make a favorable election.  See, e.g., 
Yorio, supra note 114, at 472–73. 
 123. In the overly aggressive pre-transactional tax-planning situation, a taxpayer makes a 
given election and employs overly aggressive tax planning in an attempt to achieve optimal tax 
consequences.  The IRS successfully challenges the claimed tax consequences.  In response to the 
IRS’s challenge, the taxpayer retroactively seeks to alter the election.  In the case of some 
elections, the taxpayer cannot retroactively modify the election.  See, e.g., Yorio, supra note 114, 
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named situations described in connection with the actual transaction 
doctrine.124  Further, in all three situations, existing rules limit the taxpayer’s 
ability to make post-transactional tax decisions, at least in the case of some 
elections.125   
II.  THE UNDESIRABILITY OF POST-TRANSACTIONAL TAX DECISIONS 
As previously discussed, tax law is generally hostile to post-transactional tax 
decisions.  This hostility may be designed to serve a number of underlying 
goals that have been offered as justification for a general aversion to tax 
planning.  First, the law may seek to prevent post-transactional tax decisions to 
prevent tax revenue erosion.  Second, the law may discourage  
post-transactional decisions to promote fairness.  Finally, the law may inhibit 
post-transactional tax decisions to foster efficiency. 
A.  Preventing Tax Revenue Erosion 
Tax law may limit post-transactional tax decisions as a way of preventing 
tax revenue erosion.  Any tax decision, whether pre-transactional or  
post-transactional, can result in lower tax revenue collection than what would 
occur in the decision’s absence because the object of tax decisions is to reduce 
a taxpayer’s effective tax rate.  Tax planning, as a whole, has been criticized 
because of its tax revenue reducing effects.126  Due to the benefit of hindsight, 
taxpayers’ post-transactional tax decisions would be more accurate than  
pre-transactional tax decisions.  Thus, post-transactional tax decisions would 
lead to even more tax revenue reduction than pre-transactional tax decisions. 
B.  Promoting Fairness 
Additionally, tax planning has been criticized because of its potential to 
undermine fairness in the tax system.127  Particularly if sophisticated,  
well-advised taxpayers are more likely to engage in tax planning, discouraging 
                                                                                                                                         
at 480–83 (“The courts have generally been antagonistic to taxpayer revocations in response to 
tax audits.”).  However, occasionally a court has allowed a taxpayer to revoke an election in such 
a case, at least when the court is convinced that the tax consequences challenged by the IRS were 
claimed by the taxpayer as a result of a good faith misunderstanding of resulting tax 
consequences.  See, e.g., Mamula v. Comm’r, 346 F.2d 1016, 1018–19 (9th Cir. 1965); Meyer’s 
Estate v. Comm’r, 200 F.2d 592, 595–97 (5th Cir. 1952); Gentsch v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., 151 F.2d 997, 1001 (6th Cir. 1945).  These cases, in which a taxpayer succeeds, may be 
better characterized as cases involving inadequate pre-transactional tax planning rather than cases 
involving overly aggressive pre-transactional tax planning. 
 124. See supra Part I.B. 
 125. A complete discussion of retroactivity limitations on tax elections is beyond the scope of 
this Article.  For further discussion of this topic, see generally Aubree L. Helvey & Beth Stetson, 
The Doctrine of Election, 62 TAX LAW. 335, 338 (2009) and Yorio, supra note 114. 
 126. See, e.g., Blatt, supra note 75, at 394 (listing as one goal of the non-disavowal doctrine 
the need to preserve tax revenue); Schizer, supra note 5, at 1319. 
 127. See, e.g., Field, supra note 114, at 23–24; Schizer, supra note 5, at 1319. 
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tax planning generally can promote fairness.128  A fairer tax system is a worthy 
goal in and of itself because a fairer system can decrease wealth inequality.  In 
addition, promoting fairness is desirable because it can increase the perception 
that the tax system is fair which, in turn, can foster improved tax 
compliance.129 
Although this observation can justify discouraging all tax planning, it does 
not justify placing greater restrictions on post-transactional tax decisions than 
pre-transactional tax decisions.130  In fact, disproportionately restricting  
post-transactional tax decisions subverts fairness by granting an even greater 
advantage to those who engage in effective pre-transactional tax decisions.131   
Placing a premium on pre-transactional tax decisions is particularly 
troublesome because sophisticated taxpayers are much more likely than 
unsophisticated taxpayers to seek tax advice at the pre-transactional stage.132  
Unsophisticated taxpayers are not likely to seek advice at the pre-transactional 
stage because they are unaware that altering their decisions could significantly 
affect their tax liability.133  By contrast, at the post-transactional stage, 
sophisticated and unsophisticated taxpayers are on more even ground because 
even unsophisticated taxpayers may seek tax advice at the tax return 
preparation stage and become aware of foregone opportunities to structure 
their activities in a different manner.134  Therefore, restricting  
post-transactional tax decisions more than pre-transactional tax decisions could 
disproportionately harm unsophisticated taxpayers.  
                                                            
 128. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 5, at 1319 (“Since wealthy and well advised taxpayers 
have an edge in planning, limiting [tax planning] can lead to a more equitable distribution of tax 
burdens.”). 
 129. See, e.g., id. (describing one effect of limiting tax planning as follows, “The average 
taxpayer’s faith in the system is preserved, promoting voluntary compliance and the attendant 
savings in enforcement costs.”); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and 
Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1497 (2003) (describing how sanctions 
“may help maintain the average contribution level and thereby maintain contributions”). 
 130. See infra Part III. 
 131. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 132. Moreover, even inadequate pre-transactional tax advice protects taxpayers because a 
taxpayer who receives faulty advice may be able to bring a malpractice action against his or her 
advisor for any errors that occur.  See, e.g., Victoria A. Levin, The Substantial Compliance 
Doctrine in Tax Law: Equity vs. Efficiency, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1587, 1615 (1993) (discussing how 
prohibiting taxpayers from correcting errors in tax elections is problematic because it will 
increase malpractice litigation, and it bars those who did not hire a tax advisor from being 
compensated for inadvertent errors).  For discussion of the limitations of this protection, however, 
see infra note 189. 
 133. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 134. See Cauble, supra note 114, at 285–86 (providing a similar discussion). 
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C.  Fostering Efficiency 
Scholars have criticized tax planning because it potentially creates 
inefficiency and wastes societal resources.135  In particular, a taxpayer who 
engages in tax planning may select a transaction that generates a lower pre-tax 
return than an alternative transaction, creating less societal wealth than would 
be produced had the taxpayer chosen a different transaction.136   
A numerical example illustrates this effect of tax planning.  Assume in one 
transaction (Transaction A), a taxpayer would earn, over one year, a 14%  
pre-tax return, but a 12% after-tax return.  By contrast, over the same time 
period, the taxpayer would earn a 15% pre-tax return, but a 10% after-tax 
return, by engaging in a different transaction (Transaction B).  Assume both 
transactions involve similar risk.  If the taxpayer engages in tax planning, he or 
she will consider tax consequences when evaluating the transactions and will 
likely opt for Transaction A because it maximizes the taxpayer’s private 
wealth.  From a societal standpoint, however, the choice to engage in 
Transaction A is wasteful.  Investing $100 in Transaction A for one year yields 
a total of $114 instead of the $115 total from Transaction B.  If the taxpayer 
engaged in Transaction A, he or she will pay only $2 in tax for a net profit of 
$12.  When the taxpayer engages in Transaction B, he or she will pay $5 in tax 
for a net profit of $10.  Therefore, although Transaction A generates more 
individual wealth, the total profit from Transaction A is $1 less than the total 
profit from Transaction B.  These results are summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 135. See, e.g., Field, supra note 114, at 22–23 (generally, scholars conclude that tax planning 
is detrimental to societal welfare); Michael S. Knoll, Tax Planning, Effective Marginal Tax Rates, 
and the Structure of the Income Tax, 54 TAX L. REV. 555, 555 (2001) (“Tax planning not only 
creates harmful perceptions, it also is frequently harmful in its own right. . . . [T]ax planning leads 
taxpayers to invest in many projects that they would not undertake solely on the economics.”); 
Schizer, supra note 5, at 1319 (stating that limiting tax planning reduces “social waste . . . as 
taxpayers refrain from tax motivated behavior”); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, 
and Efficiency in Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1632 (1999) [hereinafter Weisbach, Line 
Drawing] (“Taxing similar activities differently causes behavioral distortions . . . .”). 
 136. Additionally, scholars have observed that tax planning is wasteful because the time and 
resources devoted to tax planning could be put to better, more productive uses.  See, e.g., Knoll, 
supra note 135, at 555–56 (“From a societal standpoint, it would be better simply to reduce taxes 
and redeploy the time and talent devoted to tax planning to other more productive pursuits.”); 
Weisbach, Ten Truths, supra note 5, at 222 (“Nothing is gained by finding new ways to turn 
ordinary income into capital gain, to push a gain offshore, or to generate losses. No new 
medicines are found, computer chips designed, or homeless housed through tax planning.”). 
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     TABLE 1.  NUMERICAL EXAMPLE OF EFFECTS OF TAX PLANNING 
  TRANSACTION A  TRANSACTION B 
Pre-Tax Return 14% 15% 
Effective Tax Rate 14.29% 33.33% 
After-Tax Return 12% 10% 
$100 invested for one year: 
Total Profit $14 $15 
Tax Paid $2 $5 
Profit Retained by Taxpayer $12 $10 
 
Tax planning would be less prevalent if applicable laws were designed so 
that tax planning was less beneficial.  In the example above, if Transaction A 
were subject to the same tax rate that applies to Transaction B, taxpayers 
would not benefit from tax planning.  In particular, assume Transaction A is 
subject to the same 33.33% effective tax rate that applies to Transaction B and 
assume the pre-tax return generated by each transaction equals the pre-tax 
return shown in Table 1.  The result is that Transaction B will generate a 
higher after-tax return than Transaction A.  Specifically, the taxpayer would 
earn a 9.33% after-tax return by engaging in Transaction A, but a 10%  
after-tax return by engaging in Transaction B.  Thus, the taxpayer will opt for 
Transaction B because it maximizes the taxpayer’s private wealth.  Moreover, 
from a societal standpoint, the selection of Transaction B is also advantageous.  
By engaging in Transaction B, the taxpayer earns $10 of net profit and pays $5 
in tax.  Instead, if the taxpayer engaged in Transaction A, the taxpayer would 
earn $9.33 of net profit and pay $4.67 in tax.  Thus, the total profit generated 
from Transaction B ($10 retained by the taxpayer plus $5 paid in taxes or $15 
in total) is more than the total profit that would have been generated from 
Transaction A ($9.33 retained by the taxpayer plus $4.67 paid in taxes or $14 
in total).  These results are summarized in Table 2 below. 
TABLE 2.  NUMERICAL EXAMPLE OF EFFECTS OF DISCOURAGING 
TAX PLANNING 
  TRANSACTION A  TRANSACTION B 
Pre-Tax Return 14% 15% 
Effective Tax Rate 33.33% 33.33% 
After-Tax Return 9.33% 10% 
$100 invested for one year: 
Total Profit $14 $15 
Tax Paid $4.67 $5 
Profit Retained by Taxpayer $9.33 $10 
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Notwithstanding the example above, discouraging tax planning has an 
unclear overall effect on efficiency.  In particular, restricting some tax planning 
might undermine efficiency rather than foster it.  Specifically, limiting certain 
tax planning strategies could encourage taxpayers to refocus their efforts on 
even more wasteful strategies.137  For example, subjecting Transactions A and 
B to the same tax treatment will not improve overall efficiency if other 
available, comparable transactions continue to yield lower pre-tax returns but 
higher after-tax returns than Transactions A and B.138   
                                                            
 137. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 5, at 1320 (“[E]ven if some planning is stopped, total 
planning waste could still increase if those who continue to plan face higher costs.”); Weisbach, 
Disrupting the Market, supra note 5, at 972–74; Weisbach, Line Drawing, supra note 135,  
1628–30, 1664–71; Weisbach, Ten Truths, supra note 5, at 239.  See generally Philip A. Curry et 
al., Creating Failures in the Market for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAX REV. 943 (2007) (discussing 
how policymakers face a trade-off when considering taking steps to attack current tax planning 
strategies, namely, the trade-off between (i) costs arising from taxpayers’ use of those current tax 
planning strategies and (ii) costs arising from taxpayers’ search for new tax planning strategies 
once the existing methods are attacked). 
 138. To demonstrate this, Table 3 shows Table 1 modified to include a third possible 
transaction, Transaction C.  If the results of three transactions are as shown in Table 3 and if the 
transactions involve similar amounts of risk and otherwise are close substitutes for each other, the 
taxpayer will select Transaction A because it generates the highest after-tax return.  From a 
societal standpoint, this choice is not optimal because Transaction A generates a lower pre-tax 
return than Transaction B, but Transaction A is preferable to Transaction C from a societal 
standpoint. 
 
 
TABLE  3.  
  TRANSACTION A TRANSACTION B TRANSACTION C 
Pre-Tax Return 14% 15% 13% 
Effective Tax Rate 14.29% 33.33% 20% 
After-Tax Return 12% 10% 10.40% 
$100 invested for one year: 
Total Profit $14 $15 $13 
Tax Paid $2 $5 $2.60 
Profit Retained by Taxpayer $12 $10 $10.40 
 
Assume Transactions A and B are subject to the same effective tax rate and that Transaction C is 
a ready substitute for Transactions A and B.  As shown in Table 4, Transaction C generates the 
highest after-tax return.  Consequently, the taxpayer engages in Transaction C, which is wasteful 
from a societal standpoint.  Given that Transaction C’s pre-tax return is lower than Transaction 
A’s pre-tax return, discouraging taxpayers from choosing Transaction A forces taxpayers into 
Transaction C, an even more wasteful transaction, thereby undermining the goal of improving 
efficiency. 
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In summary, the effects that curbing tax planning have on efficiency are 
generally unclear and dependent on the surrounding circumstances.  Likewise, 
restricting post-transactional tax decisions has unclear ramifications with 
respect to fostering efficiency.139   
III.  THERE ARE PREFERABLE WAYS TO ADDRESS THE CONCERNS 
UNDERLYING THE RESTRICTIONS ON POST-TRANSACTIONAL TAX 
DECISIONS 
As discussed in Part II, tax laws may deter post-transactional tax decisions 
as a means of serving several underlying goals, including: preventing tax 
revenue erosion, promoting fairness, and fostering efficiency.  In many cases, 
all three goals would be better served by rationalizing the law.  In other words, 
the goals would be better served by eliminating situations in which similar 
forms of a given transaction receive different tax treatment.140  However, 
rationalizing the law may be infeasible in many instances.141  Thus, different 
transactional forms will continue to receive different tax treatment in some 
cases, and reforms other than rationalizing the law must be explored.      
A.  The Unexpected Economic Outcome Situation 
In the unexpected economic outcome situation, a taxpayer selects a given 
transactional form because it will lead to the most beneficial tax consequences 
given the expected economic outcome of the transaction.142  However, the 
economic outcome of the transaction proves to be different than expected, and, 
thus, the taxpayer would have been able to achieve more favorable tax 
consequences had he or she used an alternative form.143  Because of the actual 
transaction doctrine, the taxpayer cannot claim the tax consequences that 
would have resulted from the alternative form.144   
                                                                                                                                         
TABLE 4.  
  TRANSACTION A TRANSACTION B TRANSACTION C 
Pre-Tax Return 14% 15% 13% 
Effective Tax Rate 33.33% 33.33% 20% 
After-Tax Return 9.33% 10% 10.40% 
$100 invested for one year: 
Total Profit $14 $15 $13 
Tax Paid $4.67 $5 $2.60 
Profit Retained by Taxpayer $9.33 $10 $10.40 
 
 139. See infra Parts III.A.3, III.C.3. 
 140. See infra Part IV.B. 
 141. See infra Part IV.B; see also infra note 195. 
 142. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing further the unexpected economic outcome situation). 
 143. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing further the unexpected economic outcome situation). 
 144. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing further the unexpected economic outcome situation). 
1050 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:1013 
In the unexpected economic outcome situation, the actual transaction 
doctrine prevents tax revenue erosion but has murkier effects on the goals of 
promoting fairness and fostering efficiency.  The actual transaction doctrine 
should still apply in this case, however, because the doctrine prevents tax 
revenue erosion and does not seriously undermine fairness, and it is not of 
primary importantance with regard to efficiency. 
1.  Preventing Tax Revenue Erosion 
In the unexpected economic outcome situation, the actual transaction 
doctrine prevents tax revenue erosion.  Without the actual transaction doctrine, 
taxpayers would not only be able to engage in pre-transactional tax planning to 
reduce expected tax revenues but could also achieve favorable tax 
consequences should their economic projections turn out to be inaccurate. 
2.  Promoting Fairness 
In the unexpected economic outcome situation, the actual transaction 
doctrine limits the post-transactional tax decisions of a taxpayer who engaged 
in pre-transactional tax planning.  Consequently, applying the doctrine in this 
situation does not penalize a taxpayer simply because he or she did not conduct 
adequate pre-transactional tax planning.  Thus, in the unexpected economic 
outcome situation, applying the actual transaction doctrine does not always 
favor taxpayers who are savvier tax planners.  Applying the doctrine in this 
situation does, however, reward sophisticated persons in a different respect.  In 
particular, persons who accurately predict the economic results of their 
transactions will pay less in tax than persons who inaccurately predict the 
economic results of their transactions.  Thus, to the extent that sophisticated 
persons tend to predict more exactly the economic results of their transactions, 
sophisticated persons disproportionately benefit from current rules.  
Consequently, the actual transaction doctrine could be criticized for causing 
unfairness in the unexpected economic outcome situation.  Although this 
criticism has some merit, at least two factors ameliorate the fairness concerns 
that arise when applying the doctrine in this situation. 
First, unfairness is problematic, in part, because it contributes to the 
perception that the tax system is unfair, and that perception can undermine 
voluntary tax compliance.145  Generally, the type of disparity thought to 
contribute to the perception that the system is unfair arises when taxpayers 
benefit from greater expertise with respect to tax law.146  The public’s trust in 
the tax system is undermined by the perception that taxation is easily avoidable 
as long as a taxpayer knows the right loopholes.147  By contrast, the view that 
                                                            
 145. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra note 129. 
 147. See Knoll, supra note 135, at 555 (“The specter of wealthy individuals and large 
corporations hiring legions of high-priced lawyers and accountants to develop and implement tax 
saving strategies creates the perception that the system is unfair.”). 
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taxpayers can pay less tax if they more accurately predict the economic 
outcome of their transactions is less likely to contribute to harmful perceptions 
of the tax system.  This type of disparity does not involve sophisticated 
taxpayers benefiting from tax loopholes.  Rather, this disparity involves 
taxpayers achieving greater success when they more precisely predict the 
results of their businesses and, regardless of the tax rules, the public likely 
accepts the unavoidable conclusion that people who make better economic 
predictions will be more prosperous. 
Second, from a fairness perspective, if current rules continue to limit  
post-transactional tax decisions in the inadequate pre-transactional  
tax-planning situation, it is crucial for the rules to continue to apply in the 
unexpected economic outcome situation.148  If the rules applied in the former 
situation but not in the latter, taxpayers with more sophisticated tax knowledge 
would not only benefit disproportionately from the opportunity to engage in 
tax planning before a transaction, but, if they happened to predict wrongly the 
economic outcome of their transactions, they would also be afforded a second 
chance.  Such a system would bestow even greater benefits on taxpayers who 
are sophisticated with respect to tax planning.   
In summary, although applying the actual transaction doctrine in the 
unexpected economic outcome situation raises some fairness concerns, these 
concerns are not overly troubling and, thus, do not justify altering the 
application of the doctrine in this situation.  
3.  Fostering Efficiency 
As discussed above, tax planning can breed inefficiency because tax 
consequences can distort taxpayers’ decisions so that they select transactions 
that generate lower pre-tax returns than alternative, comparable transactions.149  
Applying the actual transaction doctrine in the unexpected economic outcome 
situation, however, has unclear effects on the tendency of taxpayers to select 
transactions that generate lower pre-tax returns than alternative transactions.  
In some cases, the actual transaction doctrine may mitigate inefficiency,150 but, 
in others cases, the doctrine might have no effect on inefficiency,151 and, in 
still other cases, the doctrine can actually exacerbate inefficiency.152  
                                                            
 148. Moreover, even if the reforms proposed in this Article were adopted, post-transactional 
tax decisions would not always be available to taxpayers who fail to adequately plan before 
engaging in a transaction.  For instance, if a taxpayer chooses a non-optimal transactional form 
because of a failure to adequately plan ahead of time and the taxpayer does not discover the 
mistake until after he or she has filed tax returns reporting the results from the transactional form 
actually used, the proposed reforms would offer no relief.  See infra Part IV.A.  Likewise, if a 
doctrine other than the actual transaction doctrine prevents a given post-transactional tax decision, 
this Article’s proposed reforms would provide no assistance. 
 149. See supra Part II.C. 
 150. See infra Part III.A.3.a. 
 151. See infra Part III.A.3.b. 
 152. See infra Part III.A.3.c. 
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Moreover, other aspects of tax law likely dominate tax planning decisions so 
that these other aspects have greater effects than the actual transaction doctrine 
on the tendency of taxpayers to select transactions that generate lower  
pre-tax returns than alternative transactions.153 
a.  Sometimes the Actual Transaction Doctrine Helps 
In certain situations, the actual transaction doctrine can mitigate the 
inefficiency resulting from tax consequences distorting taxpayers’ decisions.  
To illustrate, imagine a taxpayer contemplating a transaction that could be 
structured in either of two ways.  The first approach (Form One) generates a 
slightly lower pre-tax return than the second approach (Form Two).   
The effective tax rate for each option depends on the economic outcome of 
the transaction.154  Assume that there are two possible economic outcomes of 
the transaction.  The taxpayer expects the first outcome (Likely Outcome), but 
the taxpayer understands the potential for another outcome (Unlikely 
Outcome).  In the event of the Likely Outcome, Form One subjects the 
taxpayer to a lower effective tax rate than Form Two.  In the event of the 
Unlikely Outcome, Form Two subjects the taxpayer to a lower effective tax 
rate than Form One.  Table 5 summarizes the results assuming the actual 
transaction doctrine applies.  The effective tax rates provided in Table 5 and 
subsequent tables are not based on specific transactions.  However, given that 
effective tax rates depend on many aspects of a transaction, such as the 
character of income that it generates, and on many features of the taxpayer, 
including income and losses arising from other sources,155 the effective tax 
rates listed could plausibly arise from real transactions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 153. See infra Part III.A.3.d. 
 154. See supra Part I.B.1 (providing an example of how the tax consequences of a given 
transactional form can depend on the transaction’s economic outcome). 
 155. See, e.g., Knoll, supra note 135, at 557–58 (describing how items of income are taxed at 
different effective rates because of the existence of various tax advantaged assets and because of 
taxpayer-specific features such as net operating loss carry-forwards). 
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TABLE 5.  RESULTS WITH ACTUAL TRANSACTION DOCTRINE 
 FORM ONE FORM TWO 
 Pre-tax 
Return 
Effective 
Tax Rate 
After-tax 
Return 
Pre-tax 
Return 
Effective 
Tax Rate 
After-tax 
Return 
Likely 
Outcome  
(70% chance) 
14% 19% 11.34% 15% 25% 11.25% 
Unlikely 
Outcome  
(30% chance) 
4.9% 30% 3.43% 5% 0% 5% 
Expected Pre-
tax Return 70% (14%) + 30% (4.9%) = 11.27% 70% (15%) + 30% (5%) = 12% 
Expected 
After-tax 
Return 
70% (11.34%) + 30% (3.43%) = 8.97% 70% (11.25%) + 30% (5%) = 9.38% 
 
Table 5 reflects the application of the actual transaction doctrine.  By 
contrast, Table 6 shows the results of the same example, absent the actual 
transaction doctrine.  The only difference between the two tables is the 
effective tax rate of Form One if the Unlikely Outcome occurs.  If not for the 
actual transaction doctrine and if the Unlikely Outcome occured, the taxpayer 
could claim that he or she was entitled to the tax consequences that would have 
followed from Form Two because he or she could have used that form.  As a 
result, if not for the actual transaction doctrine, the effective tax rate of Form 
One if the Unlikely Outcome occurred would be the same as the effective tax 
rate of Form Two. 
This example demonstrates that the actual transaction doctrine can, in some 
cases, increase the likelihood of the taxpayer adopting a form that generates a 
higher pre-tax return.  As shown in Table 5, under the actual transaction 
doctrine, Form One leads to a lower expected after-tax return than Form Two.  
In particular, Form One leads to an expected after-tax return of 8.97%, while 
Form Two results in an expected after-tax return of 9.38%.  Thus, when 
selecting between the two forms, the savvy taxpayer will choose Form Two.  
Moreover, opting for Form Two rather than Form One is also beneficial from a 
societal standpoint because Form Two generates a higher expected pre-tax 
return (12% versus 11.27%). 
In contrast, without the actual transaction doctrine, Form One would lead to 
a higher expected after-tax return than Form Two, as shown in Table 6.  In 
particular, without the doctrine, Form One would produce an expected  
after-tax return of 9.41% while Form Two would yield an expected after tax-
return of 9.38%.  Consequently, without the actual transaction doctrine, the 
sophisticated taxpayer would opt for Form One and this choice would not be 
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advantageous from a societal standpoint because Form One generates a lower 
expected pre-tax return (11.27% versus 12%).156  
TABLE 6.  RESULTS WITHOUT ACTUAL TRANSACTION DOCTRINE 
 FORM ONE FORM TWO 
 Pre-tax 
Return 
Effective 
Tax Rate 
After-tax 
Return 
Pre-tax 
Return 
Effective 
Tax Rate 
After-tax 
Return 
Likely Outcome 
(70% chance) 14% 19% 11.34% 15% 25%
157 11.25% 
Unlikely Outcome 
(30% chance) 4.9% 0% 4.9% 5% 0% 5% 
Expected Pre-tax 
Return 70% (14%) + 30% (4.9%) =  11.27% 70% (15%) + 30% (5%) = 12% 
Expected After-tax 
Return 
70% (11.34%) + 30% (4.9%) = 
9.41% 70% (11.25%) + 30% (5%) = 9.38% 
 
In summary, from a societal standpoint, the taxpayer makes a more 
beneficial choice than that chosen by the taxpayer if the actual transaction 
doctrine did not apply in the unexpected economic outcome situation under the 
facts reflected in Tables 5 and 6. 
b.  Sometimes the Actual Transaction Doctrine Does Not Matter 
In some cases, the actual transaction doctrine will have no effect on the 
tendency of tax consequences to distort taxpayers’ decisions.158  This can be 
                                                            
 156. See supra Part II.C. 
 157. Even if the actual transaction doctrine did not apply in the unexpected economic 
outcome situation, this rate remains 25% rather than 19% (the effective tax rate of Form One), 
assuming that the doctrine continues to apply in the inadequate pre-transactional tax-planning 
situation.  If a taxpayer selects Form Two rather than Form One, the facts would be those of an 
inadequate pre-transactional tax-planning situation given that the taxpayer would have selected 
the form that yields a lower after-tax return if the transaction produces its expected economic 
outcome.  If the actual transaction doctrine was eliminated entirely, this rate would be 19% rather 
than 25%. 
 158. This could also be the case in situations where the alternative forms of the transaction 
generate the same pre-tax return.  In some cases, pre-tax returns will be different.  For instance, in 
the example in Part I.B.1, pre-tax returns could be different if the non-tax expenses associated 
with Form One were higher than those expenses incurred under Form Two.  In other cases, both 
the form used and the alternative form will generate identical pre-tax returns.  This would be true 
when the only difference between the two forms is whether the taxpayer has made a given tax 
election.  However, even if the pre-tax returns of different transactional forms are identical, 
limitations on post-transactional tax decisions can affect efficiency.  In particular, limitations on 
post-transactional tax decisions could decrease the after-tax returns of both of the forms, which 
could, in turn, prompt a taxpayer to engage in an entirely different transaction.  From an 
efficiency standpoint, this result would be positive if the different transaction yielded a higher 
pre-tax return, but negative if the different transaction produced a lower pre-tax return. 
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illustrated by slightly changing the assumptions used in Tables 5 and 6.  Tables 
7 and 8 illustrate the results under these new assumptions both with and 
without the actual transaction doctrine. 
Table 7 reveals the results with the actual transaction doctrine.  The Table 
demonstrates that even with the doctrine, tax consequences distort the 
taxpayer’s choice.  In particular, the taxpayer will opt for Form One because it 
generates a higher expected after-tax return than Form Two (9.73% versus 
9.38%).  From a societal standpoint, this decision is not optimal because Form 
Two yields a higher expected pre-tax return than Form One (12% versus 
11.27%).159 
TABLE 7.  RESULTS WITH ACTUAL TRANSACTION DOCTRINE 
 FORM ONE FORM TWO 
 Pre-tax 
Return 
Effective 
Tax Rate 
After-tax 
Return 
Pre-tax 
Return 
Effective 
Tax Rate 
After-tax 
Return 
Likely Outcome 
(70% chance) 14% 15% 11.90% 15% 25% 11.25% 
Unlikely 
Outcome  
(30% chance) 
4.9% 5% 4.66% 5% 0% 5% 
Expected Pre-tax 
Return 70% (14%) + 30% (4.9%) =  11.27% 70% (15%) + 30% (5%) = 12% 
Expected  
After-tax Return 70% (11.90%) + 30% (4.66%) = 9.73% 70% (11.25%) + 30% (5%) = 9.38% 
 
In contrast, Table 8 details the results without the actual transaction doctrine.  
With this change, the taxpayer would still select Form One because it would 
produce a higher expected after-tax return than Form Two (9.80% versus 
9.38%).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 159. See supra Part II.C (discussing why an investment that generates a lower pre-tax return 
is not optimal from a societal point of view). 
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TABLE 8.  RESULTS WITHOUT ACTUAL TRANSACTION DOCTRINE 
 FORM ONE FORM TWO 
 Pre-tax 
Return 
Effective 
Tax Rate 
After-tax 
Return 
Pre-tax 
Return 
Effective 
Tax Rate 
After-tax 
Return 
Likely Outcome 
(70% chance) 14% 15% 11.90% 15% 25%
160 11.25% 
Unlikely 
Outcome  
(30% chance) 
4.9% 0% 4.9% 5% 0% 5% 
Expected  
Pre-tax Return 70% (14%) + 30% (4.9%) =  11.27% 70% (15%) + 30% (5%) = 12% 
Expected  
After-tax Return 70% (11.90%) + 30% (4.9%) = 9.80% 
70% (11.25%) + 30% (5%) = 
9.38% 
 
The examples in Tables 7 and 8 reveal that, in the unexpected economic 
outcome situation, the actual transaction doctrine sometimes has no effect on a 
taxpayer’s decision to select a transactional form that yields a lower expected 
pre-tax return than an alternative transaction.  Consequently, in some cases, the 
actual transaction doctrine has no effect on the tendency of tax consequences 
to distort taxpayers’ decisions.  
c. Sometimes the Actual Transaction Doctrine Causes Harm 
In some cases, the actual transaction doctrine can exacerbate inefficiencies.  
To illustrate, imagine a taxpayer who contemplates engaging in a transaction 
(Transaction A), which could be structured in one of two ways.  The first 
method (Form One) generates a slightly lower pre-tax return than the second 
method (Form Two).  Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the transaction, with 
and without the actual transaction doctrine.  The relevant numbers to compare 
in these tables are also summarized in Table 9.  As Table 9 shows, Transaction 
A Form Two generates a higher expected pre-tax return than Transaction A 
Form One (12% versus 11.27%).  Taking into account the actual transaction 
doctrine, Transaction A Form Two also produces a higher expected after-tax 
return than Transaction A Form One (9.38% versus 8.97%).  However, while 
Transaction A Form Two would still yield a higher pre-tax return than 
Transaction A Form One, if it were not for the actual transaction doctrine, the 
                                                            
 160. Even if the actual transaction doctrine did not apply in the unexpected economic 
outcome situation, this rate remains 25% rather than 15% (the effective tax rate of Form One), 
assuming the doctrine continues to apply in the inadequate pre-transactional tax-planning 
situation.  If a taxpayer selects Form Two rather than Form One, the facts would be those of an 
inadequate pre-transactional tax-planning situation because the taxpayer would have selected the 
form that yields a lower after-tax return if the transaction produces its expected economic 
outcome.  If the actual transaction doctrine were entirely eliminated, this rate would be 15% 
rather than 25%. 
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taxpayer would expect a higher after-tax return as a result of investing in 
Transaction A Form One (9.41% versus 9.38%).   
In addition to the facts described above, assume, instead of executing 
Transaction A, the taxpayer could carry out a different transaction entirely, 
namely Transaction B.  Transactions A and B involve similar amounts of risk.  
The expected pre-tax return of Transaction B is 11%.  The expected after-tax 
return of Transaction B is 9.40%.  Table 9 also includes the results of 
Transaction B. 
TABLE 9.  EFFECT OF ACTUAL TRANSACTION DOCTRINE 
 WITH ACTUAL TRANSACTION DOCTRINE 
 Transaction A 
Form One 
Transaction A 
Form Two Transaction B 
Expected  
Pre-tax Return 11.27% 12% 11% 
Expected  
After-tax Return 8.97% 9.38% 9.40% 
 WITHOUT ACTUAL TRANSACTION DOCTRINE 
 Transaction A 
Form One 
Transaction A 
Form Two Transaction B 
Expected  
Pre-tax Return 11.27% 12% 11% 
Expected  
After-tax Return 9.41% 9.38%
161 9.40% 
                                                            
 161. If the actual transaction doctrine were entirely eliminated (rather than modified so that it 
no longer applied in the unexpected economic outcome situation), this rate would be 10% rather 
than 9.38%.  Ten percent is what results if, in Table 6, 19% (rather than 25%) is the effective tax 
rate for Form Two in the event of the Likely Outcome.  See supra note 160.  Even compared to a 
system eliminating the doctrine, the actual transaction doctrine could either cause a positive or 
negative effect depending on the facts assumed for Transaction B.  For example, under the facts 
assumed in Table 9, if the actual transaction doctrine were entirely eliminated, the taxpayer would 
select Transaction A Form Two given that its expected after-tax return (10%) would be higher 
than the expected after-tax returns of the alternative transactions.  Once the doctrine is applied, 
the taxpayer would select Transaction B, given that its expected after-tax return (9.40%) is higher 
than the expected after-tax returns of the alternative transactions.  Thus, under the facts in Table 
9, applying the actual transaction doctrine undermines efficiency, compared to a system in which 
the doctrine was entirely eliminated.  If the facts in Table 9 were changed such that the expected 
pre-tax return of Transaction B was 13%, then applying the doctrine would have a positive effect, 
compared to a world in which the doctrine did not exist at all.  Specifically, the taxpayer would 
still select Transaction B in a world with the doctrine, rather than Transaction A Form Two.  
However, this change would be positive, rather than negative, in a case in which Transaction B’s 
expected pre-tax return is higher than that of Transaction A Form Two, the transaction selected 
without the doctrine. 
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 As Table 9 reflects, without the actual transaction doctrine, the taxpayer 
would opt for Transaction A Form One that yields an expected after-tax return 
of 9.41%, which is higher than the expected after-tax return of either of the 
alternative transactions (9.38% or 9.40%).  This selection does not optimize 
the benefit to society because Transaction A Form One’s expected pre-tax 
return of 11.27% is lower than that of Transaction A Form Two at 12%.  
However, society benefits more from the taxpayer’s choice than Transaction B, 
which yields an expected pre-tax return that is even lower than that of 
Transaction A Form One (11% versus 11.27%).  Once the actual transaction 
doctrine is factored into the analysis, the taxpayer adopts Transaction B 
because it generates the highest expected after-tax return (9.40% compared to 
8.97% and 9.38%).  Thus, the application of the actual transaction doctrine 
results in a pre-transactional tax decision that is even more inefficient given 
that the taxpayer’s chosen transaction produces a lower expected pre-tax return 
than the transaction the taxpayer would have used if the actual transaction 
doctrine did not apply. 
d.  Summary: The Goal of Fostering Efficiency     
In the unexpected economic outcome situation, the actual transaction 
doctrine has unclear effects on the goal of increasing efficiency.  In some 
cases, the doctrine can further the goal or at minimum do no harm.  However, 
in other cases, the doctrine can undermine the goal of efficiency.   
Specifically, the actual transaction doctrine undermines the goal of 
efficiency when the doctrine encourages taxpayers to engage in other, more 
wasteful forms of tax planning.  Whether this result is likely to occur depends 
on the availability of alternative tax planning strategies, which, in turn, 
depends on at least two factors.  First, these even more wasteful tax planning 
strategies will be less readily available in situations where the  
substance-over-form doctrine, and similar rules, effectively foreclose such 
strategies.162  For instance, in the example in Table 9, if Transaction B would 
be recharacterized as Transaction A based on substance-over-form principles, 
then Transaction B would not have a higher after-tax return than Transaction 
A, even under the actual transaction doctrine.  As a result, the doctrine would 
not cause the harm illustrated in Table 9.  Second, wasteful decision-making is 
less likely to the extent that transactions with similar non-tax features receive 
similar tax treatment.  For instance, the harm shown in Table 9 is more likely 
to occur if Transaction B is a ready substitute for Transaction A.  However, if 
transactions that were ready substitutes received similar tax treatment and if 
Transaction B were a close alternative to Transaction A, then in Table 9, 
Transaction B would be subject to the same effective tax rate as Transaction A.  
Consequently, Transaction B would produce a lower expected after-tax return 
                                                            
 162. See supra notes 5, 14–22 and accompanying text (providing discussion of the  
substance-over-form doctrine and similar rules). 
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than either form of Transaction A, thereby preventing the harm shown in Table 
9.    
Overall, factors other than the actual transaction doctrine, such as the 
effectiveness of the substance-over-form doctrine and the extent to which close 
substitutes are taxed similarly, likely have much stronger effects on taxpayers’ 
decision-making than the effects caused by limitations on post-transactional 
tax decisions.  This is particularly true because some taxpayers may not even 
consider the tax consequences that will result from a transaction if it produces 
an unexpected economic outcome.  For these taxpayers, applying the actual 
transaction doctrine in the unexpected economic outcome situation has no 
effect on tax planning decisions. 
B.  The Inadequate Pre-Transactional Tax-Planning Situation 
In the inadequate pre-transactional tax-planning situation, before engaging in 
a transaction, a taxpayer does not obtain tax advice or receives faulty tax 
advice.163  Accordingly, the taxpayer is unaware that he or she could obtain 
more beneficial tax results by choosing an alternative transactional form.164  
After the transaction has begun, the taxpayer discovers the error and tries to 
claim the tax results that would have followed from using the alternative 
form.165  The IRS can challenge this claim by invoking the actual transaction 
doctrine.166  
In the inadequate pre-transactional tax planning situation, the actual 
transaction doctrine furthers the goal of preventing tax revenue erosion.167  
However, applying the doctrine in this situation undermines the goal of 
promoting fairness and has minimal effects on the goal of fostering 
efficiency.168  Thus, the actual transaction doctrine should no longer apply in 
the inadequate pre-transactional tax planning situation provided that certain 
requirements are met.169 
1.  Preventing Tax Revenue Erosion 
In the inadequate pre-transactional tax-planning situation, the actual 
transaction doctrine prevents tax revenue erosion.  Without the doctrine, 
taxpayers could not only engage in pre-transactional tax planning that 
minimizes tax revenue collected, but, if they failed to obtain proper advice  
beforehand, they could obtain advice afterward and achieve the same favorable 
                                                            
 163. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 164. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 165. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 166. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 167. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 168. See infra Part III.B.2–3. 
 169. See infra Part IV.A (discussing this proposal in detail).  This analysis assumes that lost 
tax revenue would be recouped in ways that were not any worse, from a fairness perspective, than 
current rules. 
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tax consequences.  In other words, applying the actual transaction doctrine in 
the inadequate pre-transactional tax planning situation collects additional tax 
revenue by levying more tax upon taxpayers who fail to effectively utilize  
pre-transactional tax planning. 
2.  Promoting Fairness 
From a fairness perspective, the actual transaction doctrine is most troubling 
when applied in the inadequate pre-transactional  
tax-planning situation.  In this situation, the doctrine favors taxpayers simply 
because they engage in effective pre-transactional tax planning.  As discussed 
above, particularly at the pre-transactional stage, sophisticated taxpayers are 
more likely to engage in tax planning than unsophisticated taxpayers.170  
Consequently, calling upon the doctrine in this situation disproportionately 
benefits sophisticated taxpayers.   
3.  Fostering Efficiency 
The actual transaction doctrine as applied in the inadequate pre-transactional 
tax-planning situation has minimal effects on the goal of fostering efficiency.  
Any effects that the doctrine does have undermine the efficiency goal.  In order 
to illustrate this observation, two groups of taxpayers need to be analyzed 
separately: first, the taxpayers who do not engage in adequate  
pre-transactional tax planning under current law, and second, the taxpayers 
who do.   
a.  Taxpayers Who Do Not Tax Plan Currently 
Some taxpayers fail to engage in adequate pre-transactional tax planning, 
despite the existence of limitations on post-transactional tax decisions.  Even if 
these limitations were relaxed, the current non-tax planners would still not 
engage in pre-transactional tax planning.171  Thus, with respect to this group of 
taxpayers, removing the actual transaction doctrine in the inadequate  
pre-transactional tax-planning situation would not increase their  
pre-transactional tax decisions but would only increase their post-transactional 
tax decisions. 
As discussed above, tax planning can cause inefficiency because tax 
consequences can distort taxpayers’ decisions such that they select transactions 
that generate lower pre-tax returns than alternative, comparable transactions.172  
This effect of tax planning is not applicable in the context of post-transactional 
                                                            
 170. See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text. 
 171. If anything, taxpayers would be less inclined to use pre-transactional tax planning if its 
benefits were eroded by increased opportunities to make tax decisions after a transaction. 
 172. See supra Part II.C. 
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tax decisions foreclosed by the actual transaction doctrine.173  Pre-transactional 
tax decisions can result in a taxpayer undertaking a transaction that differs 
from what the taxpayer would have chosen for non-tax reasons.  If a taxpayer 
does not engage in planning at the pre-transactional stage, the taxpayer will 
select a transaction based upon non-tax factors alone and, therefore, will tend 
to choose a transaction that generates a higher pre-tax return than comparable, 
alternative transactions, thus fostering efficiency.  In the inadequate  
pre-transactional tax-planning situation, when a taxpayer attempts to engage in 
the type of post-transactional tax decision prevented by the actual transaction 
doctrine, the taxpayer is not attempting to alter the transaction in which he or 
she engaged.174  The taxpayer does not alter the transaction used because a 
post-transactional tax decision that is prevented by the actual transaction 
doctrine merely revises how a transaction is reported.175  Therefore, the 
taxpayer is not attempting to carry out a transaction other than the one he or 
she selected for non-tax reasons.  As discussed, relaxing the rules in the 
inadequate pre-transactional tax-planning situation would cause taxpayers to 
make more post-transactional tax decisions but would not cause taxpayers to 
make more pre-transactional tax decisions.  Ultimately, reforming the rules in 
                                                            
 173. This is the case because post-transactional tax decisions that are limited by the actual 
transaction doctrine merely involve revising how a transaction is reported.  See infra note 175 and 
accompanying text.  By contrast, post-transactional tax decisions that are limited by rules 
regarding unwinding transactions, for example, could cause inefficiency because such decisions 
involve undertaking a transaction that differs from the transaction that the taxpayer initially 
undertook.  See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 174. See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text. 
 175. As discussed previously, the actual transaction doctrine is the roadblock in a taxpayer’s 
way when the alternative transaction and the transaction actually used are equally true to the same 
underlying substance.  See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.  Thus, the transaction 
used and the alternative transaction are similar for non-tax purposes.  Given this similarity, one 
might question whether a pre-transactional tax decision to engage in the alternative transaction 
could be inefficient.  In other words, if the transaction chosen and the alternate transaction are 
similar, they may generate the same pre-tax returns so that a choice of one over the other would 
not generate inefficiency.  However, in some instances, the two transactions will generate 
different pre-tax returns despite the fact that the transactions are very similar.  In the example 
previously shown in Figures 1 and 2, Form One could involve some non-tax costs not associated 
with Form Two.  For example, when using Form One, in order to obtain additional liability 
protection, Mr. Cash might form a limited liability company (an LLC) and have the LLC acquire 
the 10% interest in the assets, rather than directly acquiring the 10% interest in the assets.  In the 
case of Form Two, because Mr. Cash never acquires the assets directly, forming an LLC would 
be unnecessary.  Forming the LLC would involve some additional non-tax costs, and, thus, Form 
One would generate a slightly lower pre-tax return than Form Two.  However, even if the LLC is 
used in Form One, Forms One and Two are still comparable from a tax perspective because the 
LLC would be disregarded as separate from Mr. Cash for tax purposes.  If it were not for the 
actual transaction doctrine, a taxpayer who does not consider tax consequences ahead of time 
could use Form Two, which generates a higher pre-tax return, later discover that Form One would 
have led to more favorable tax consequences, and therefore report the results of Form One 
without actually engaging in the transaction using that form, and, therefore, without engaging in a 
transaction that generates a lower pre-tax return. 
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this manner would not cause taxpayers to more frequently select transactions 
that generate lower pre-tax returns than alternative, comparable transactions.  
In summary, with respect to taxpayers who currently fail to engage in  
pre-transactional tax planning, applying the actual transaction doctrine in the 
inadequate pre-transactional tax-planning situation has a minimal effect on the 
goal of fostering efficiency. 
b.  Taxpayers Who Currently Tax Plan 
Many taxpayers who currently utilize pre-transactional tax planning would 
continue to do so even if the actual transaction doctrine was not applied in the 
inadequate pre-transactional tax-planning situation.  In particular, given the 
other limitations on post-transactional tax decisions (such as constraints on the 
ability to unwind a transaction for tax purposes), taxpayers who currently tax 
plan beforehand would likely continue to do so even if the actual transaction 
doctrine did not apply in the inadequate pre-transactional  
tax-planning situation.  Thus, applying the doctrine in this situation has little 
effect on the inefficiency produced by taxpayers who engage in  
pre-transactional tax planning.   
Moreover, if no longer applying the actual transaction doctrine were to have 
any effect at all on taxpayers who currently plan, one would expect these 
taxpayers to engage in less, and not more, pre-transactional tax planning.  This 
effect of limiting the doctrine is plausible because taxpayers would be able to 
make post-transactional tax decisions to compensate for a lack of  
pre-transactional tax planning and, thus, may view pre-transactional tax 
planning as less necessary.  From the perspective of efficiency, this may be a 
positive result because pre-transactional tax planning can undermine the goal 
of fostering efficiency.176   
Consequently, with respect to taxpayers who engage in pre-transactional tax 
planning under current law, applying the actual transaction doctrine in the 
inadequate pre-transactional tax-planning situation has minimal effects on the 
goal of fostering efficiency but, if anything, may undermine this goal. 
C.  The Overly Aggressive Pre-Transactional Tax-Planning Situation 
In the overly aggressive pre-transactional tax-planning situation, the 
taxpayer opts for a given form of a transaction (Form Three) in an attempt to 
attain optimal tax consequences.177  The IRS challenges the form the taxpayer 
used as not adequately reflecting the substance of the transaction and assesses 
some amount of additional tax.178  In response, the taxpayer attempts to claim 
the tax consequences that would have resulted from an alternative form of the 
                                                            
 176. See supra note 175. 
 177. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 178. See supra Part I.B.3. 
2012] Rethinking the Timing of Tax Decisions 1063 
transaction (Form One).179  The alternative form leads to more favorable tax 
consequences than those that would follow from a successful challenge by the 
IRS, but less favorable tax consequences than what the taxpayer originally 
claimed.180  Even though the effects on efficiency are not entirely clear, the 
actual transaction doctrine should still apply in the overly aggressive  
pre-transactional tax-planning situation because the doctrine prevents tax 
revenue erosion and promotes fairness. 
1.  Preventing Tax Revenue Erosion 
In the overly aggressive pre-transactional tax-planning situation, the actual 
transaction doctrine can prevent tax revenue erosion in two ways.  First, the 
doctrine deters taxpayers from engaging in overly aggressive pre-transactional 
tax planning.  Second, the doctrine collects more tax revenue from taxpayers 
who are undeterred.   
Regarding deterrence, without the actual transaction doctrine, taxpayers may 
be more inclined to opt for Form Three because, if the results they claimed 
were challenged, they could still obtain the tax results of Form One.181  
However, given the existence of the actual transaction doctrine, one cost of 
engaging in overly aggressive tax planning, such as picking Form Three, is 
foregoing the opportunity to engage in less aggressive tax planning, for 
example, by selecting Form One in lieu of Form Two.  In this way, the actual 
transaction doctrine imposes an implicit penalty upon taxpayers who undertake 
overly aggressive tax planning that the IRS challenges.182  This implicit 
penalty will discourage taxpayers from using such risky tax planning, thus 
resulting in additional revenue collection from taxpayers who might otherwise 
utilize such planning without being audited or challenged.  
The actual transaction doctrine also increases tax revenue by imposing 
greater tax liability on taxpayers who are undeterred from engaging in overly 
aggressive tax planning.183  In the aforementioned example, if a taxpayer was 
able to claim the tax consequences that would have resulted from Form One, 
he or she would owe less tax liability than what he or she would owe if the 
transaction is determined to lead to the less favorable tax consequences that 
follow from the IRS recharacterizing Form Three as Form Two. 
                                                            
 179. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 180. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 181. See Hasen, supra note 98, at 935 (describing a similar situation that could arise if a 
taxpayer attempts to unwind a transaction in response to a challenge by the IRS and stating, 
“Permitting taxpayers to unwind in this circumstance would allow them to contest the initial 
denial of favorable treatment by the government and, if unsuccessful, to obtain a second-best 
result through the unwind.  In effect, the availability of unwind treatment makes the tax liability 
on an alternative, less aggressive transaction the exercise price of a put option on taking a more 
aggressive position.”). 
 182. Id. 
 183. See supra Part I.B.3. 
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2.  Promoting Fairness 
Applying the actual transaction doctrine in the overly aggressive  
pre-transactional tax-planning situation promotes fairness by discouraging 
overly aggressive pre-transactional tax planning.  Taxpayers who engage in 
overly aggressive pre-transactional tax planning without being audited will pay 
less tax than other, similarly situated taxpayers.  This potential for some 
taxpayers to benefit is particularly troubling from the perspective of fairness, 
given that sophisticated taxpayers are more likely to engage in  
pre-transactional tax planning than unsophisticated taxpayers.184  
Consequently, deterring overly aggressive tax planning may promote fairness, 
and such tax planning can be deterred by applying the actual transaction 
doctrine in the overly aggressive pre-transactional tax-planning situation.185 
3.  Fostering Efficiency 
The application of the actual transaction doctrine to the overly aggressive 
pre-transactional tax-planning situation has uncertain effects on efficiency.  
The application of the actual transaction doctrine deters taxpayers from 
selecting Form Three and encourages taxpayers to select Form One instead.186  
Thus, if Form One generates a higher pre-tax return than Form Three, the 
actual transaction doctrine promotes efficiency.  However, if Form Three 
generates a higher pre-tax return than Form One, the actual transaction 
doctrine undermines efficiency.        
IV.  PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW 
The actual transaction doctrine applied to the inadequate pre-transactional 
tax-planning situation may prevent some tax revenue erosion, but it does so at 
the expense of undermining fairness by favoring sophisticated taxpayers.187  In 
addition, applying the doctrine in this situation has minimal effects on the goal 
of fostering efficiency but, if anything, may undermine this goal.188  
Consequently, the actual transaction doctrine should no longer apply in the 
inadequate pre-transactional tax-planning situation, provided that certain 
requirements are met. 
A.  Proposal in Detail 
The actual transaction doctrine should no longer apply in the inadequate  
pre-transactional tax planning situation, provided that the following three 
requirements are met.  First, the taxpayer must convincingly establish that he 
or she selected a given transactional form over an alternative form because of 
                                                            
 184. See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 186. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 187. See supra Parts III.B.1–2. 
 188. See supra Parts III.B.3. 
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inadequate pre-transactional tax planning.189  The taxpayer must show that he 
or she did not choose a given transactional form because he or she expected the 
transaction to generate different economic consequences.   
Second, a taxpayer may report the tax consequences that follow from an 
alternative transactional form only if the taxpayer has not already filed tax 
returns reporting the results from the transactional form actually used.  
Limiting reform in this way addresses administrative concerns that would arise 
if tax returns had already been filed, and would have to be amended and 
potentially re-audited.   
Third, a taxpayer may report the tax consequences that follow from an 
alternative transactional form only if all taxpayers involved in the transaction 
agree to report the tax consequences based upon the same alternative form.  
This prevents potential whipsaw of the IRS that could otherwise occur.190  In 
particular, unless all parties involved in a transaction agree to report tax 
consequences based on the same alternative transactional form, the parties 
could report inconsistent tax consequences.  For example, assume one taxpayer 
(Acquiring Party) is acquiring property from another taxpayer (Disposing 
Party).  If the taxpayers are not required to report results based on the same 
transactional form, the Acquiring Party could report tax consequences 
following from the transactional form actually used if it results in the 
Acquiring Party obtaining a higher tax basis in the property.  At the same time, 
the Disposing Party could report tax consequences following from an 
alternative transactional form that results in the Disposing Party recognizing a 
lesser amount of tax gain with respect to the property.  If this inconsistency 
was allowed, the taxpayers would whipsaw the IRS because the Acquiring 
Party would obtain a higher tax basis without the Disposing Party paying the 
cost required to obtain that higher basis, namely, the recognition of tax gain.  
This potential whipsaw is avoided if all parties agree to report tax 
consequences based on a given alternative transactional form. 
                                                            
 189. Inadequate pre-transactional tax planning includes a lack of planning before undertaking 
a transaction.  It could also encompass a situation in which a taxpayer uses a transactional form 
that leads to higher tax liability than an alternative form as a result of receiving faulty advice 
ahead of time.  In the latter case, it might be argued that no change to the actual transaction 
doctrine is necessary because the taxpayer can obtain a remedy by bringing a malpractice claim 
against the advisor who provided faulty counsel.  For further discussion of this possibility, see 
supra note 132.  Although this argument has merit, there is also merit to allowing such a taxpayer 
to report the tax results of the alternative form.  If the advisor who provided faulty counsel 
discovers the error, the advisor will be more likely to alert the taxpayer to this information if the 
taxpayer is able to correct the error by reporting the results of the alternative transactional form.  
If bringing a malpractice claim is the taxpayer’s only remedy, the taxpayer may be less likely to 
discover that the initial advice was flawed. 
 190. For discussion of the whipsaw concern, see supra note 32. 
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B.  An Alternative: Rationalizing the Law 
In lieu of the reforms proposed above, modifications to tax law could focus 
on eliminating situations in which similar transactions receive different tax 
treatment.  If the law were “rationalized,” which is to say if multiple forms of a 
transaction that are equally true to the same underlying substance received the 
same tax treatment, the actual transaction doctrine would no longer be 
necessary.191  Moreover, rationalizing the law could better mitigate many of 
the harms arising from pre-transactional tax planning, including tax revenue 
erosion, unfairness, and inefficiency.   
Regarding tax revenue erosion, more tax revenue could be collected if tax 
law were rationalized.  Even under the currently applied actual transaction 
doctrine, taxpayers can exploit available pre-transactional tax-planning 
opportunities resulting from the fact that different transactional forms receive 
different tax treatment.192  If the law was rationalized, the Treasury would lose 
less revenue as a result of pre-transactional tax planning. 
Rationalizing the law could also serve the goal of promoting fairness.  If the 
law was rationalized, regardless of the transactional form used, a taxpayer 
would achieve the same tax consequences.  Thus, in many cases, tax 
                                                            
 191. In the example described in Part II.B.2, the law was later rationalized such that both the 
form used and the alternative form lead to the same tax consequences.  In particular, after the 
repeal of the “General Utilities” doctrine, the transaction used and the alternative transaction lead 
to the same tax consequences.  Under current law, the tax treatment of the transaction used and 
the alternative transaction are as follows: as a result of the transaction used, when Subsidiary 
redeems half of the stock in Subsidiary held by Parent in exchange for a check and a note (worth 
$100), Parent will recognize a gain from sale of the Subsidiary stock equal to the excess of the 
value of the check and note ($100) over Parent’s basis in the Subsidiary stock ($40), or $60 of 
gain.  I.R.C. §§ 302(a), 302(b)(3) (2006).  When Parent transfers the note and check to Exiting 
Shareholder in redemption of the Parent stock held by Exiting Shareholder, Exiting Shareholder 
will recognize a gain from the sale of the Parent stock equal to the excess of the value of the 
check and note ($100) over Exiting Shareholder’s basis in the Parent stock ($30), or $70 of gain.  
§§ 302(a), 302(b)(3).  The same tax consequences result from the alternative form of the 
transaction.  Under this form, when Parent distributes half of the Subsidiary stock that it holds to 
Exiting Shareholder in redemption of Exiting Shareholder’s interest in Parent, Parent will 
recognize a gain from a deemed sale of the Subsidiary stock equal to the excess of the value of 
the Subsidiary stock ($100) over Parent’s basis in the Subsidiary stock ($40), or $60 of gain.   
§ 311(b).  Exiting Shareholder’s basis in the Subsidiary stock received will equal fair market 
value ($100).  Additionally, upon receipt of the Subsidiary stock, Exiting Shareholder will 
recognize a gain from the sale of the Parent stock equal to the excess of the value of the 
Subsidiary stock ($100) over Exiting Shareholder’s basis in the Parent stock ($30), or $70 of gain.  
§§ 302(a), 302(b)(3).  When the check and note are distributed from Subsidiary to Exiting 
Shareholder in redemption of the Subsidiary stock, no further gain or loss will be recognized by 
Exiting Shareholder or Subsidiary, because (i) Subsidiary’s basis in the check and note, (ii) 
Exiting Shareholder’s basis in the Subsidiary stock, and (iii) the fair market value of the check 
and note each equal $100.  Thus, regardless of the form of the transaction, Parent recognizes $60 
of gain from the sale of Subsidiary stock, and Exiting Shareholder recognizes $70 of gain from 
the sale of Parent stock. 
 192. See supra Part I.B for examples. 
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consequences would be less dependent on whether a taxpayer received 
adequate tax advice before engaging in a transaction.  In other words, 
rationalizing the tax law makes it more substance-driven and less dependent on 
form, and substance-based tax consequences would be more consistent with 
the expectations of unsophisticated taxpayers.193  Thus, taxpayers that failed to 
seek advice before engaging in a transaction would be less disadvantaged 
because tax consequences would be more consistent with their uninformed 
expectations.   
Regarding inefficiency, if the law was rationalized, by definition, equivalent 
forms of a given transaction would lead to the same effective tax rate.  As a 
result, a taxpayer would select among the forms based on non-tax factors such 
as the forms’ pre-tax returns.  These results may be positive from the 
perspective of fostering efficiency.  Alternatively, it is also possible that 
eliminating one opportunity for tax planning, namely, the opportunity to select 
among differently-taxed, equivalent transactional forms, could cause a 
taxpayer to engage in other, even more wasteful types of tax planning.  Thus, 
in some cases, rationalizing the law could breed inefficiency by encouraging 
taxpayers to refocus their pre-transactional tax planning on more wasteful 
strategies.194   
Although rationalizing the law may, in many cases, be a preferable solution 
for the reasons previously described, rationalizing the law will not always be 
politically feasible or desirable.195  For this reason, differing tax treatment of 
similar transactional forms will persist, the actual transaction doctrine will 
have enduring relevance, and the proposed reforms to the doctrine will 
continue to have merit.       
                                                            
 193. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra note 137 (discussing this phenomenon in connection with limiting tax 
planning opportunities generally). 
 195. For example, in the case in which the form involves making (or not making) a tax 
election so that a business is treated as a partnership and the alternative form involves making (or 
not making) a tax election so as to conduct the same business as a corporation, rationalizing the 
law would entail equalizing the tax treatment of partnerships and corporations.  Such reform is 
likely politically unfeasible.  Legal scholars, economists, and other commentators have long 
advocated for reform of the corporate tax system in order to integrate the entity-level tax and the 
tax that applies to shareholders upon receipt of dividends to make the tax treatment of 
corporations more similar to partnerships.  Despite abundant calls for corporate tax integration, 
the corporate tax system continues as distinct from the partnership tax system.  A discussion of 
the arguments supporting corporate tax integration is beyond the scope of this Article.  For some 
discussion of corporate tax integration, see generally Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined  
Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. 
REV. 265 (1995); R. Glenn. Hubbard, Corporate Tax Integration: A View From the Treasury 
Department, 7 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 115 (1993); Charles E. McLure, Integration of the 
Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 532 (1975); and Alvin Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and 
Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 719 (1981). 
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C.  Potential Criticisms 
The proposed reforms may elicit a number of criticisms that fall in one of 
two categories.  The first category includes concerns that the reforms do not 
accomplish enough, and the second category consists of claims that the 
reforms go too far. 
1.  The Reforms Do Not Accomplish Enough 
First, one concern might be that taxpayers will not discover their mistake in 
time to claim the tax consequences that would follow from an alternative 
transactional form.  For the same reasons that unsophisticated taxpayers do not 
seek pre-transactional tax advice alerting them to the benefits of using an 
alternative form, they may not learn of these benefits after the transaction 
occurs.  Although this concern has merit, the reforms, nevertheless, represent 
an improvement upon current law in that the reforms will assist some 
additional unsophisticated taxpayers. In particular, even when unsophisticated 
taxpayers do not seek tax advice ahead of time, in some cases they will seek 
advice at the tax return preparation stage because they will be aware of the 
need to report tax consequences after a transaction occurs.196   At this stage, 
advisors could alert them to the tax consequences that would have followed 
from an alternative form.  Moreover, because this will occur at the return 
preparation stage, mistakes will be uncovered in some cases before any tax 
returns are filed and, thus, at a time when the mistakes can still be corrected 
under the proposed reforms.197     
A second concern may be that reforms will have little practical effect given 
the requirement that all affected taxpayers must agree to report tax 
consequences based on the same alternative transactional form.  It is true that, 
often, the parties to a transaction will have opposing interests.198  In connection 
with a given transaction, one party may obtain better tax consequences by 
reporting the results of the form actually used, while the other party might 
obtain better tax consequences by reporting the results of an alternative 
form.199  In such a transaction, the first party is unlikely to agree to report the 
consequences of the alternative form unless the second party compensates the 
first party for doing so.200  However, in addition to the possibility that the party 
who benefits from the alternative reporting could compensate the party who is 
                                                            
 196. See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 198. In the example in Part IV.A, for instance, the Acquiring Party and the Disposing Party 
have opposing interests. 
 199. In the example in Part IV.A, for instance, the Acquiring Party and the Disposing Party 
have opposing interests. 
 200. In the example in Part IV.A, the Acquiring Party could pay a greater purchase price to 
the Disposing Party in exchange for the Disposing Party’s agreement to report tax consequences 
based on a form that results in the Acquiring Party obtaining a higher tax basis and the Disposing 
Party recognizing more tax gain. 
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harmed, there are also many transactions in which the interests of the parties 
are aligned, as demonstrated by the following example.  In the transaction 
described in Part I.B.1 and shown in Figures 1 and 2, if the assets both have 
built-in gains, Form One would lead to tax consequences that are better, or at 
least as good, for all involved parties than the tax consequences that would 
follow from Form Two.  If the parties failed to receive adequate advice and 
used Form Two, the parties conceivably could later agree to report the 
consequences that would have followed from Form One.     
A final concern may be that continued restrictions on post-transactional tax 
decisions, such as restrictions on the ability to unwind a transaction for tax 
purposes, would dampen the ability of the proposed reforms to promote 
fairness because these restrictions would continue to disproportionately harm 
unsophisticated taxpayers.  Although this concern has merit in that some 
aspects of unfairness would persist, the proposed reforms have the virtue of 
addressing many of the most blatant causes of unfairness.  The proposed 
reforms apply in cases where, if the taxpayer had received any adequate  
pre-transactional advice, he or she almost certainly would have structured a 
transaction differently.  In order to demonstrate this point, one must recall that 
the reforms would apply when an alternative transactional form was available 
and both that form and the form actually used were equally true to the same 
underlying substance.  In other words, the reforms apply when the non-tax 
differences between the form used and the alternative form are minimal or 
non-existent.  Given the lack of significant non-tax differences, the choice of 
the alternative form would have been easy and automatic if the taxpayer had 
been informed about its tax benefits.  Thus, the reforms address cases in which 
taxpayers who do not receive pre-transactional tax advice are deprived of 
opportunities available to informed taxpayers to obtain significant tax benefits 
without incurring substantial non-tax costs.      
2.  The Reforms Go Too Far 
First, one may object to the reforms on the grounds that they will discourage 
planning before a transaction, which could have negative non-tax implications.  
For some taxpayers, pre-transactional tax planning might provide collateral 
benefits because a taxpayer may discover non-tax issues warranting 
consideration.  For example, the sense that tax-planning opportunities exist 
may prompt an individual to consult a lawyer about estate planning 
considerations, which could lead to resolution of non-tax issues. 
In response to this concern, one can observe that, even with the proposed 
changes to the actual transaction doctrine, post-transactional tax decisions 
would not always be available to taxpayers who fail to engage in  
pre-transactional tax planning because the actual transaction doctrine is not the 
only obstacle to post-transactional tax decisions.201  In particular, as previously 
                                                            
 201. See supra Part I.C. 
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discussed, the actual transaction doctrine applies only when the form used and 
the alternative form are equally true to the same underlying substance.202  In 
some cases, the transaction undertaken will not have the same substance as the 
alternative transaction because many non-tax differences will distinguish the 
two transactions.203  In such a case, a taxpayer would be entitled to claim the 
tax consequences of the alternative transaction only if he or she reversed the 
non-tax effects of the actual transaction and subsequently carried out the 
alternative transaction.204  Limitations on a taxpayer’s ability to unwind a 
transaction for tax purposes will hinder the taxpayer’s ability to do so.  Thus, 
post-transactional tax decisions will continue to be unavailable in some cases 
that involve inadequate pre-transactional tax planning.  Because of the 
continued limitations on post-transactional tax decisions, the proposed reforms 
would not likely cause taxpayers to cease engaging in pre-transactional tax 
planning. Thus, taxpayers who currently tax plan would not lose the collateral 
benefits of tax planning. 
A second  concern might be that an inadequate pre-transactional  
tax-planning situation could be difficult to distinguish from an unexpected 
economic outcome situation.  Thus, it might not be possible to allow  
post-transactional tax-planning decisions in the former situation without also, 
inadvertently, allowing such decisions in the latter. 
To address this concern, a burden could be placed on taxpayers to 
convincingly establish that their choice of a transactional form resulted from a 
lack of adequate pre-transactional tax planning.  For example, a taxpayer may 
show that he or she did not receive tax advice before the transaction.  
Alternatively, if he or she did receive tax advice, the taxpayer could 
demonstrate that the advice was based upon economic projections that turned 
out to be accurate.  If the taxpayer can show that the economic outcome of the 
transaction was expected, it would be natural to infer that the taxpayer failed to 
choose the alternative form because of misinformation about tax law or, stated 
differently, because of inadequate pre-transactional tax planning.  Again, it 
helps to bear in mind that the actual transaction doctrine applies when the form 
used does not differ from the alternative form in any significant non-tax 
respects.  Because the forms achieve the same non-tax objectives, if the 
taxpayer’s economic predictions are correct and the taxpayer is properly 
informed about tax law, the taxpayer has no reason to do anything other than 
pick the form that leads to favorable tax consequences.  Hence, if a taxpayer’s 
economic predictions are correct and the taxpayer fails to pick the form that 
leads to favorable tax consequences, it is natural to infer that the taxpayer was 
not properly informed about tax law. 
                                                            
 202. See supra Part I.C. 
 203. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 204. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Tax law disallows post-transactional tax decisions in a variety of ways.  One 
example is the actual transaction doctrine.  Restrictions on post-transactional 
tax decisions may be designed to serve a number of underlying policy goals.  
Such goals include: preventing tax revenue erosion, promoting fairness, and 
fostering efficiency.  In many cases, these goals would be best served by 
reforming the law so that similar forms of a given transaction lead to the same 
tax consequences.  However, because rationalizing the law in this manner will 
not always be feasible, alternative reforms should be explored.  One such 
alternative reform involves revising the actual transaction doctrine to more 
readily allow post-transactional tax decisions when taxpayers fail to engage in 
adequate pre-transactional tax planning. 
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